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ABSTRACT
In 1999 the Federal Communications Commission decided to relax its prohibition against
one firm owning two television stations in the same market. Although joint ownership
was prohibited prior to 1999, evidence on the effects of joint operation is provided by
local marketing agreements, contractual arrangements that allow one station to operate
another station in the same market. Chapter 1 studies the effect of joint operation on
costs by estimating a model of television station entry decisions from 1993 to 1998.
Using the method of simulated moments to estimate the entry model, I find that stations
operated under local marketing agreements are significantly more likely to enter.
Controlling for the endogeneity of local marketing agreements and the competition-
reducing effects of local marketing agreements does not affect the conclusion that joint
operation reduces costs.
Chapter 2 uses the experience with local marketing agreements to study the effects of
joint operation on markets for advertising and programming. Using panel data on over
160 markets from 1993 to 1998, I find that most mergers do not increase the price of
advertising. However, mergers between stations that are likely to be close substitutes (as
measured by their network affiliation) can lead to significant price increases. In the
programming market I find that the ratings of merging stations increase, suggesting that
mergers increase the quality and variety of programming.
During the 1990s the broadcast television industry also experienced significant
consolidation at the national level. This consolidation was spurred in part by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which relaxed restrictions on the number of television
stations a firm carl own nationwide. Chapter 3 studies the effect of group ownership on
viewers by using ratings data for 750 television stations in 1993 and 1998. I find that the
increase in group ownership led to small increases in ratings.
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Chapter 1
The Cost Effects of Television Local Marketing Agreements: Evidence
from Entry
1. Introduction
In 1999 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) revised its local
television ownership rules to relax the longstanding prohibition against one firm owning
two television stations in the same market. In evaluating policy towards joint ownership,
it is necessary to consider both market power and efficiency effects. A merger between
two stations in the same market may allow stations to increase the price of advertising or
decrease the quality of programming. However, if there are efficiencies associated with
joint operation the merger will also reduce costs. In Chapter 2 I find that the market
power effects of joint operation in television are generally small. In this chapter I study
the effect of joint operation on costs.
To study the effects of joint ownership I use the evidence provided by local
marketing agreements (LMAs). Local marketing agreements are contractual
arrangements that exploit a loophole in the local ownership rules, thereby allowing one
station to operate another station in the same market. LMAs first appeared in the
television industry in the early 1990s. Although the use of LMAs was limited by
uncertainty about how they would be treated by the FCC, there were over 60 LMAs in
existence by 1997.
I estimate a model of television station entry to determine the effect of LMAs on
costs. If stations involved in an LMA have lower costs than other stations, then LMA
stations should be more likely to enter. By using entry decisions to draw inferences about
profitability, this paper builds upon the equilibrium entry literature developed by
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Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991) and Berry (1992). With its focus on the
profitability effects of entrant characteristics, this paper is closest to Berry. However, this
paper differs in several respects from previous papers in the entry literature. First, instead
of being forced to make somewhat arbitrary assumptions about the set of potential
entrants in each market, I am able to use the institutions of the television industry to
identify potential entrants. This distinction is important because variation in the number
of potential entrants in each market aids in the identification of economically important
parameters. Second, previous papers have considered entrant characteristics that affect
only costs and that are exogenous. I study a characteristic that may affect competition as
well as costs and that also may be endogenous. LMAs may increase profitability not only
by reducing costs, but also by reducing competition. To separate these two effects, I
allow profits to depend on the number of firms in the market as well as the number of
stations in the market. In addition, the decision to form a LMA may be correlated with
the unobservable component of profitability. To address this endogeneity problem, I
instrument for LMAs using firm-level differences in the propensity to form LMAs.
Since the entry model allows unobservable characteristics of stations to be freely
correlated and also allows one of the entrant characteristics to be endogenous, maximum
likelihood estimation would require the computation of many intractable
multidimensional integrals. Instead, I use the method of simulated moments to estimate
the entry model. I find that LMAs significantly increase the probability of entry. My
results predict that adding an LMA increases the probability of entry from 0.09 to 0.93.
This increased entry probability is not the result of LMAs only being formed by
profitable stations, as instrumenting for LMAs does not affect this result. In addition, I
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do not find any evidence that the increased profitability of LMA stations is due to LMAs
causing a reduction in competition. These results support the hypothesis that LMAs
reduce costs. Hence further relaxation of the FCC's local ownership rules may be
warranted.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
review. Section 3 describes the institutional details of the television industry that are
relevant for estimating an entry model, and Section 4 explains the entry model. Section 5
discusses the endogeneity of LMAs, and Section 6 describes the estimation of the entry
model. The final sections present results, policy simulations, and conclusions.
2. Previous Literature
Although the cost effects of joint ownership in television have not been studied
previously, Anderson and Woodbury (1988) have examined this question in the context
of radio broadcasting, which has a similar cost structure. Using data from the mid-1980s,
Anderson and Woodbury compare the sales prices of jointly owned and stand-alone radio
stations. Controlling for market concentration, they estimate that the price paid for
jointly owned stations is approximately 20 percent greater than the price paid for similar
stand-alone stations. Since controlling for market concentration allows for the possible
increased market power of jointly owned stations, they attribute this difference to
efficiencies from common ownership.
By using asset values, Anderson and Woodbury are able to estimate the
magnitude of the cost savings associated with common ownership. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to use this approach in the context of television LMAs. The problem is that
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almost all of the LMA stations that have changed hands have been sold as a group, along
with other stations in different markets. Although the sales price for the group is
reported, it is not possible to determine the purchase price for individual stations within
the group.
Since asset values are not observable for most LMA stations, I instead must rely
on their observable entry decisions to draw inferences about profitability. Hence this
paper builds on the equilibrium entry literature developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987,
1990, 1991) and Berry (1992).' This literature estimates multiple-agent discrete choice
models that allow for strategic interactions among potential entrants. Papers in this
literature assume that observed entry decisions are the equilibrium of a game where
agents choose to enter or stay out of the market. The modeler specifies the form of the
entry game (simultaneous-move or sequential), and also specifies the agents' payoff
functions. Payoffs depend on the decisions of other agents, agent and market
characteristics, and unobservable factors for which the modeler makes distributional
assumptions. The choice of a solution concept determines the equilibrium outcome of the
game, and allows the modeler to calculate the probability of the observed entry decisions
as a function of the parameters. The parameters of the profit function can then be
estimated by maximum likelihood, although simulation methods may be required if the
error structure is sufficiently complicated.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1991) estimate entry models in order to determine
how the nature of competition changes as firms enter the market. They study markets
'Recent contributions to this literature include Davis (1999), Mazzeo (1999), and Toivanen and Waterson
(1999). Davis models the quantity decision of firms rather than simply the entry decision, and allows for
unobserved heterogeneity in variable profitability. In addition to modeling entry, Mazzeo also models the
product-type decision of firms. Toivanen and Waterson estimate a leader-follower model in which two
firms decide how many outlets to build.
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(service establishments in isolated U.S. towns) where it can be assumed that potential
entrants are homogenous, although Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) study markets with two
potential entrants that are allowed to have different unobserved profits. Berry's (1992)
focus is on heterogeneity among potential entrants. Looking at entry into airline city-pair
markets, Berry studies the effect of entrant characteristics on profitability.
Similar to Berry, this paper focuses on identifying the profitability effects of
entrant characteristics. In doing so it is important to correctly specify the set of potential
entrants in each market, because changes in the set of potential entrants affect estimates
of the parameters of the model. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, variation in the
number of potential entrants across markets helps to identify the parameters of the entry
model. One problem that this branch of the literature faces is specifying the set of
potential entrants in each market. Previous papers have been forced to rely on somewhat
arbitrary assumptions about potential entrants. For example, Berry assumes that only
firms that currently serve at least one city of a city-pair market are potential entrants in
that market. In contrast to previous papers, I do not have to rely as much on assumptions
about potential entrants, since the FCC's Table of Allotments explicitly defines the set of
potential stations in each market.
Another difference between this paper and the previous literature is my focus on
an entrant characteristic that may affect competition as well as costs, and that also may be
endogenous. Accounting for these features of LMAs requires me to extend Berry's
methodology in two ways. First, a potential entrant with an LMA may be more likely to
enter not because the LMA reduces costs, but because entry by a station with an LMA
does not increase competition in the market as much as entry by a station without an
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LMA would. I account for this possibility by allowing profits to depend not only on the
number of stations in the market, but also on the number of independent firms in the
market. Second, since the decision to form an LMA may depend upon profitability, the
presence of an LMA may be correlated with the unobserved component of profits. I
allow for this possibility by instrumenting for the formation of LMAs using firm-level
differences in the propensity to form LMAs.
3. The Broadcast Television Industry
3.1 Overview
Commercial television stations are in the business of selling viewers to
advertisers. The number of viewers a station attracts depends on the station's
programming, promotion, and physical characteristics such as location and signal
strength. The number of viewers watching a particular station will also depend on the
other options available to viewers. The amount for which a station sells its viewers
depends on the number of viewers and the demographics of those viewers. The price of
advertising may also depend on the amount of competition between sellers of advertising.
Television stations compete with other stations that serve the same geographic
market. The geographic markets that are generally recognized in the television industry
are Nielsen's Designated Market Areas (DMAs), which are based on county viewing
patterns. Nielsen assigns a county to a DMA if a plurality of that county's television
viewing is of stations located in that DMA, and there are currently 209 DMAs. Although
DMAs are not perfectly isolated markets, they are the markets used in negotiations
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between stations, advertisers, and programmers, and they are also the level at which most
data are available.
In studying entry into the commercial television market, it is important to note
that not all stations that are on the air are active in the market. For example, stations that
focus on infomercials, home shopping, or religious programming are not viable choices
for advertisers who wish to show a 30-second advertisement. Furthermore, even stations
with normal programming and advertising are not viewed as being competitors in the
market if they do not have significant ratings. For example, in some markets many
advertisers refuse to buy ads on programs viewed by less than two percent of the
population. 2 In describing a new station that was on average watched by only one
percent of the market population, a media buyer said that the station had not "jumped into
the realm of competition yet from an advertising standpoint" (Larson 1999).
To identify commercial television stations that are active in the advertising market
I use ratings data. The source for television stations ratings is Nielsen Media Research's
Nielsen Station Index. In 40 of the largest markets, Nielsen measures how many
households are watching each station by attaching electronic meters to the television sets
in 400-500 households in each market. In the remaining markets Nielsen relies on diaries
kept by viewers during the four months of the year known as "the sweeps" - November,
February, May, and July. Nielsen reports viewing in terms of both ratings and shares. A
station's household rating is the percentage of total households in the market watching
that station, while a station's household share is the percentage of households currently
watching television that are tuned to that station. I define a station as active in the market
2 "Local buyers attribute the dearth of local and national spot availability to many clients' requiring a
minimum 2 Nielsen rating for any given program. As such, lower-rated stations don't even make the cut,
buyers said." (Brodesser 1997)
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if its average household share over the four sweeps months of the broadcast season is at
least one. The time period over which viewing is measured is from 9:00 AM to midnight.
3.2 Local Marketing Agreements
An LMA allows one station in a market to operate a second station in the same
market without actually owning the license of that station. In a typical LMA, the licensee
of the brokered station leases the majority of its broadcast time to the owner of the
brokering station. The brokering station supplies the programming and sells the
advertising for that time, retaining all the advertising revenue, and in return pays a fixed
monthly fee to the owner of the brokered station.
The first television LMAs appeared at the end of 1991, and by 1997 there were 67
LMAs in existence (see Table 1). For the purposes of this paper it is useful to distinguish
between new-station LMAs, in which an incumbent station forms an LMA with a new
station, and existing-station LMAs, in which two existing stations form an LMA. The
last column of Table 1 lists the type of each LMA.
Joint operation of two television stations in the same market may reduce costs
because it allows the stations to share facilities and personnel. Jointly operated stations
can operate out of the same building, use the same production facilities, and share the
same general manager, program director, and sales force. Television station owners have
claimed that joint operation generates significant cost savings. For example, the operator
of one small-market LMA station has estimated that the LMA has reduced annual
operating expenses by over one-third, from $2.9 million to $1.9 million (Yudkoff 1999).
This $1 million cost reduction is due to a $200,000 decline in engineering expenses, a
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$200,000 decline in sales and marketing expenses, and a $600,000 decline in
administrative expenses.
Although joint operation of television stations may reduce costs, the FCC has
been concerned that it may also reduce competition. Hence for most of the 1990s the
FCC was deciding how to treat LMAs. The FCC had to decide several related issues.
First, the FCC had to decide whether to attribute ownership of the brokered station to the
owner of the brokering station, thereby closing the loophole that LMAs exploited.
Second, the FCC had to decide whether to modify the local ownership rule, which
prohibited one firm from owning two stations in the same market. Finally, if the FCC
closed the LMA loophole without modifying the local ownership rule, it would also have
to decide whether to grandfather existing LMAs or force their divestiture.
During this period there was considerable uncertainty about how the FCC would
treat LMAs. In November 1996, the FCC released proposed rules that would have closed
the LMA loophole without significantly modifying the local ownership rule, but indicated
that existing LMAs would probably be grandfathered. The FCC did not schedule a vote
on the rules until December 1998, and by that time the proposed final rules took a more
restrictive approach toward LMAs. Although the proposed final rules were never
formally released, leaks indicated that divestiture of most existing LMAs would be
required in one to three years. The details of the proposed rules provoked intense
opposition from the industry and Congress, forcing the FCC to delay the vote.
Finally, in August 1999 the FCC approved new rules that are less restrictive
towards LMAs and joint ownership than those proposed earlier. Although the FCC
closed the LMA loophole, it also modified the local ownership rule. Joint ownership is
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allowed as long as at least eight independent firms remain in the market after the merger
and one of the stations in the combination is not among the top four stations in the market
based on audience share. Existing LMAs that violate the new local ownership rule are
grandfathered for an initial term of five years if they started prior to November 1996, and
forced to terminate within two years otherwise.
3.3 Entry in the Television Industry
In order to study whether joint operation reduces costs, I estimate a model of
television station entry. The basic idea is that if joint operation reduces costs, a station
that has an LMA with another station in the same market will be more likely to enter than
a similar station without an LMA. Since I am interested in identifying the entry of
competitors in the advertising market, I define a station as entering when it becomes
active, where active was defined above as having an average household share of at least
one.
Since most LMAs formed during the mid-1990s, I focus on the period from 1993
to 1998. Over this period the number of active commercial television stations increased
from 807 to 901.3 In addition to the introduction of LMAs, several eneral factors may
also have contributed to entry during this period. Television advertising revenue grew
steadily after a decline in the early 1990s. The introduction of the WB and UPN
networks in 1995 may have reduced the cost of obtaining programming. Finally, UHF
stations, which have weaker signals than VHF stations, may have been helped by the
increase in cable penetration during this time.
3 These totals include stations in all DMAs except Anniston and Tuscaloosa (which were consolidated into
the Birmingham DMA in 1998) and Juneau (which was not measured by Nielsen until 1998).
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Entry was much more common than exit from 1993 to 1998: 104 stations entered
while only 10 stations exited. Since the number of potential entrants (defined below) is
less than the number of stations that could have exited, the disparity between the entry
rate (entrants divided by potential entrants) and the exit rate (exits divided by potential
exits) is even greater. As a result, I model only new entry into the market, taking the
presence of incumbent stations as given.
In order to determine how the characteristics of potential entrants affect their
entry decisions, it is necessary to identify all potential entrants. Hence an attractive
feature of the television industry is that it is possible to identify the set of potential
stations in each market using the FCC's Table of Allotments. The Table of Allotments
assigns television channels to communities and identifies which channels are reserved for
non-commercial use. A station cannot go on the air if its channel is not listed in the
Table. However, not all channels listed in the Table of Allotments had the potential to be
new stations by 1998. Determining the identity of the potential stations requires a closer
look at the FCC's licensing process.
The process of building a new television station begins when a potential entrant
files an application for an unused channel from the Table of Allotments. Once the FCC
approves the application, the potential entrant receives a construction permit and can
begin building the station. The FCC grants the license for the channel after the station
goes on the air.
Most unused channels attract multiple applicants. Prior to 1994, the FCC used
comparative hearings to decide which applicant would get the construction permit.
However, in December 1993 a federal court ruled that one of the criteria used in the
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comparative hearing process was unlawful, and in February 1994 the FCC froze all
proceedings with multiple applicants. The FCC did not award construction permits with
multiple applicants until September 1999, when they were auctioned off.
Due to the comparative proceedings freeze, the only construction permits granted
from 1994 through 1999 were those in which either there was only a single applicant, or
those in which all applicants except one dropped their applications after reaching a
settlement amongst themselves. Since FCC rules limit the payments that settling parties
can make to one another, settlements occurred only during two settlement windows in
which the FCC waived its payoff rules. There was a 90-day settlement window in 1995,
and a 180-day settlement window in 1997.
Since very few construction permits were granted after 1994 due to the FCC
freeze, I do not count channels in the Table of Allotments without construction permits as
potential stations. Because it generally requires one year to build a station once a
construction permit has been granted, I include only stations that were granted
construction permits by the end of 1996.
Low-power television stations (LPTVs) create an additional complication in
identifying potential stations. The FCC created the LPTV service in 1982 to provide
opportunities for locally oriented television service in small communities. As the name
implies, LPTVs operate at lower power than full-power stations and have smaller
coverage areas. In 1999 there were over 2,200 LPTVs in operation, and almost all were
noncommercial. However, a few LPTVs are network affiliates and have significant
ratings, primarily in markets without unused full-power channels. In 1993 nine of the
807 active stations were LPTVs, while in 1998 33 of the 901 active stations were LPTVs.
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I do not model the entry of LPTVs, primarily because it is impossible to identify
potential LPTVs. There is no Table of Allotments for LPTVs. Instead, applicants for
new LPTVs must show that the new station will not interfere with existing stations.
Although I do not model their entry decisions, I do include LPTVs that were active in
1998 as incumbent stations. In the 141 markets in my final sample (which includes only
markets with full-power potential stations) there are 16 active LPTVs: two stations that
were active in both 1993 and 1998, and 14 stations that entered by 1998. It is important
to note that modeling the entry decisions of LPTVs would likely provide additional
evidence that joint operation increases profitability. FCC rules allow firms to own full-
power and low-power stations in the same market, and full-power stations in the same
market owned many of the LPTVs that entered during this period. Of the 14 LPTVs that
entered markets in my sample, seven were owned by full-power stations in the same
market.
My final sample consists of 352 potential stations in 141 markets.4 The potential
stations fall into four categories:
* 221 stations that were on the air in 1993 but were inactive (i.e., their average
household share was less than one)
* 104 stations that obtained a construction permit prior to the FCC freeze but were not
on the air
* 18 stations that obtained construction permits between 1993 and 1997
4 Construction permits were identified and assigned to DMAs based on the listings of granted construction
permits in Warren Publishing's Television and Cable Factbook. The date the construction permit was
granted and the date the station went on the air (as measured by the date the license to cover was filed for)
are from the FCC's Broadcast Application Processing System. Satellite stations (stations that rebroadcast
the signal of another station in the same market) are not included. The San Diego and Harlingen DMAs are
excluded due to lack of data on potential stations licensed in Mexico.
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* 9 stations that were active in 1993, but inactive in 1998.
Of the 352 potential entrants, 75 stations entered by 1998. Potential stations with LMAs
entered at a significantly higher rate than potential stations without LMAs. Eighty-five
percent (34 out of 40) of the potential stations with LMAs entered, while only thirteen
percent (41 out of 312) of the other potential stations entered.5 The distribution of the
number of potential entrants, entrants, and incumbents in each market is given in Table 2.
4. Model
To draw inferences about the effect of LMAs on costs, I assume that the observed
entry decisions are the equilibrium of a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game,
each potential entrant decides whether to enter. Given the institutional details of the
television market, it is plausible to assume that potential entrants move sequentially.
Since on-the-air stations must only obtain programming to enter, while unbuilt stations
must first build the station, I assume that on-the-air (but inactive) stations move before
unbuilt stations. Among on-the-air stations, more profitable stations are assumed to
move first, while among unbuilt stations, stations are assumed to move in the order they
obtain construction permits.6
In the second stage of the entry game, stations that enter in stage one receive a
payoff that depends on station characteristics, market characteristics, and the decisions of
the other potential entrants. Stations that do not enter receive a payoff that is normalized
to zero. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game can be found by
5 Of the 40 potential stations with LMAs, 25 were not on the air in 1993 and 15 were on the air but inactive.
There is no significant difference between the entry rate for these two groups of stations.
6 The assumption used to order built potential stations is relevant only for 36% of the markets in the sample
(those with two or more built potential stations).
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backwards induction. Each station will enter if and only if the payoff from entering
exceeds zero. In deciding whether to enter, a station takes into account both the decisions
of previous movers and the effect of its entry decision on the equilibrium decisions of
subsequent movers.
To complete the model I specify a functional form for the payoff a station
receives if it decides to enter. I assume that the profits of potential station j in market i
are given by:
Zcj X + ln(N)+yln(F)+Za+pu+ - O p2u
X = Market characteristics
N = Number of stations in market
F = Number of firms in market
Z = Station characteristics
uio = Market-specific error
u = Firm-specific error
The error terms are assumed to be distributed i.i.d. standard normal across stations
and markets. Since entry decisions do not identify the total variance of the error terms, I
impose the standard normalization that the variance is one by setting the coefficient on
the firm-specific error equal to 1 - p2 . To interpret the parameter p, note thatp 2 is the
correlation of the unobservable component of profits across stations within a market.
When p = 0 there is no market-level unobservable component of profitability, and
when p = 1 there is no station-level unobservable component of profitability.
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Variation in the number of potential stations helps identify p, because different
values of p have different implications for how the distribution of actual entrants, N,
changes with the number of potential entrants. Consider the case where potential entrants
have identical observable characteristics. If p = 0 then each potential entrant in a market
draws an i.i.d. profitability error. It can be shown that in this case an increase in the
number of potential entrants shifts up the entire distribution of N. However, if p = 1 an
increase in the number of potential entrants from K to K + 1 shifts mass in the distribution
of N from K to K + 1, but does not affect the distribution of N below K. This is because
when p = 1 the unobserved component of profitability is exactly the same for each
potential entrant in the market, and the distribution of N is right censored at the number
of potential entrants.
Profits are allowed to vary both with N, the number of stations in the market, and
F, the number of firms in the market. If new stations steal viewers from existing stations
rather than attracting new viewers, the number of viewers per station will fall as N
increases, and profits will fall. If increases in the number of firms result in increased
competition, then the price per viewer charged by stations will fall, and hence profits will
fall with F as well. Although N and F are highly correlated, there are 31 markets in
which at least one firm controls two of the existing stations in the market, and hence the
number of incumbent firms is less than the number of incumbent stations. This is
primarily the result of existing-station LMAs, which are in 22 of the markets in the
sample, but also includes five markets where one firm owns both a full-power and low-
power station, and four markets in which joint ownership of full-power stations has been
allowed due to the large geographic size of the DMA.
20
The primary variable of interest is LMA, which is equal to one for the 40 potential
stations that have an LMA with an existing station in the same market. In this model
LMAs are allowed to affect profitability in two ways: by reducing costs, and by reducing
competition. If LMAs reduce costs, thereby increasing profits, then the coefficient on
LMA should be positive. However, an LMA entrant increases N without increasing F,
which allows for the possibility that the price of advertising falls less when a LMA
station enters than when a non-LMA station enters. Since my other research suggests
that the competition-reducing effects of LMAs are small, I also estimate the model
imposing the restriction y = 0. This restriction is appropriate if television stations do not
have market power, which might be the case if television advertising is part of a larger,
competitive advertising market that includes newspapers, radio, and cable.7
Table 3 presents the definitions, means, and standard deviations of the market and
station characteristics.8 The market characteristics are all measured at the DMA level.
The first two variables control for the size and growth of the market. HOUSEHOLDS is
the number of households as of January 1998, in millions. HHGROWTH is the projected
growth in the number of households from 1997 to 2002. The next two variables control
for differences in advertisers' valuations of different viewers. HHINCOME is 1997
average household income, in tens of thousands. Advertisers may be willing to pay more
for viewers with higher incomes. AGE1849 is the fraction of population in the 18-49 age
group, the demographic that television advertisers value the most. The remaining
7 Evidence that television competes with other media is provided by Ekelund, Ford and Jackson (2000),
who find significant cross-price elasticities between the demand for television advertising and the prices of
radio and newspaper advertising. Based on the own-price elasticity of demand, they conclude that local
television advertising is not a relevant antitrust market.
8 The variables HOUSEHOLDS, HHGROWTH, HHINCOME, and AGE1849 are from the 1998 Survey of
Buying Power and Media Markets. SPILLOVER is from Investing in Television. CABLEPEN, LNPOWER,
HAAT, and the latitude and longitude of the station's transmitter are from 1998 Television and Cable
Factbook. I generated HHCOVER using the latitude and longitude and CensusCD, published by Geolytics.
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market-level variables control for other factors that may affect the profitability of
operating a television station. CABLEPEN is the fraction of households subscribing to
cable in 1997. As cable penetration increases, broadcast stations may face stronger
competition from cable channels. However, since cable systems are required to carry
broadcast stations in their market, increases in cable penetration may also mean that more
viewers can receive broadcast stations. SPILLOVER is the 1993 viewing share of
television stations from other markets. This variable controls for the fact that DMAs are
not perfectly isolated markets.
The station-level variables control primarily for physical characteristics of the
station that affect profitability. VHF is equal to one for stations on the VHF band
(channels 2-13) and zero for stations on the UHF band (channels 14-69). It requires less
electricity to transmit a VHF signal, and VHF signals propagate better than UHF signals.
HHCOVER is the number of households (based on the 1990 Census) within 40 miles of
the station transmitter, divided by the number of DMA households in January 1991. This
variable is capped at 1. Potential stations that are assigned to communities far away from
the population center of the market will have low values of HHCOVER. LNPOWER is
the natural log of the station's authorized power (in kilowatts), and HAAT is the height
above average terrain of the station's transmitter (in thousands of feet).
5. Endogeneity of LMAs
One potential explanation for the fact that stations with LMAs are more likely to
enter is that the unobserved component of profits is greater for stations with LMAs.
Stations with LMAs might be more profitable (aside from the effects of the LMA)
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because the value of a new-station LMA depends on the profitability of the potential
station. The value of an LMA can be defined as the joint profits of the stations involved
in the LMA minus their joint profits in the absence of the LMA. If a potential station is
so profitable that it would be able to enter without an LMA, the value of the LMA is the
reduction in costs due to the LMA plus any increase in revenues resulting from reduced
competition. However, if a potential station is so unprofitable that it would be
unprofitable to enter even with an LMA, then the profits of both stations are unaffected
by the LMA and the value of the LMA is zero. Hence if it is costly to form LMAs, we
will not observe unprofitable potential stations forming LMAs.9 Thus it is important to
consider the possibility that potential stations that are more profitable (including both
observed and unobserved components of profitability) are more likely to form LMAs.
To solve this endogeneity problem it is necessary to find a source of variation in
LMAs that is uncorrelated with the profitability error. My approach is based on the
observation that there are firm-level differences in the propensity to form LMAs. In
television there are many firms that own stations in several different markets. Some of
these group owners, such as Clear Channel, LIN, and Sinclair, form LMAs at almost all
of the stations they own, while others do not use LMAs at all. At least some of this
variation comes from firm-level differences in attitudes towards LMAs. As I noted
previously, there was considerable uncertainty about how the FCC would decide to treat
LMAs. Firms that have been aggressive in their use of LMAs may have been more
willing to bend FCC rules, and more optimistic that the FCC would eventually decide to
allow LMAs.
9 However, note that six of the 40 potential stations that form LMAs do not enter. One explanation for
these LMAs is that LMAs are not costly to form. Another explanation is that even though it is currently
unprofitable for those stations to enter, they will become profitable in the future as the market grows.
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Another explanation for firm-level differences in the use of LMAs is that LMA-
forming firms only buy stations in markets where it is profitable to form LMAs. In this
case the unobserved component of profitability would be correlated across the markets in
which those firms own stations. To minimize this possibility, I construct instruments
based on firm locations as of 1993, prior to the widespread use of LMAs. Firm locations
at that time are likely to be a function of geography and historical accident rather than of
decisions to locate in markets where it is profitable to form an LMA. If this assumption
is valid, then the presence of a LMA-forming firm in a market increases the probability
that an LMA is formed with a potential station in that market, but is uncorrelated with the
unobserved profitability of potential stations in that market.
To exploit the firm-level differences in propensity to form LMAs, I use the
variable LMAINST. I construct LMAINST by looking at the set of firms that own stations
in market i as of 1993.10 I then consider the stations that those firms owned in other
markets as of 1993. If any of the firms that own a station in market i form an LMA at a
station in another market (either prior or subsequent to 1993), then LMAINST equals one
for market i. Otherwise LMAINST equals zero. The idea behind this strategy is that
whether a potential station forms an LMA is driven both by its underlying profitability
and by the presence of LMA-forming firms in its market. Hence as long as the
profitability error is uncorrelated across the markets in which a firm owns stations, the
formation of an LMA by a firm in one market can be used to instrument for the formation
of LMAs in other markets in which that firm owns stations.
10 The ownership information used to construct LMAINST is from the Television and Cable Factbook, and
is based on transactions announced through July 1993.
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I explore whether LMAINST helps predict the formation of LMAs in Table 4. As
is described below, my estimation procedure is based on both the number of stations in
the market and the entry decision of one station in each market. Accordingly, I present
evidence on both whether LMAINST affects the number of LMAs in a market, and also
whether LMAINST predicts the formation of LMAs at the individual stations used in the
estimation procedure. Column of Table 4 regresses the number of new-station LMAs
in a market on LMAINST, the number of VHF stations in the market, the maximum
values of HHCOVER, LNPOWER, and HAAT in the market, and the market-level
variables. Column 2 is a probit where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether
the station has an LMA, and the independent variables are the station- and market-level
variables. The coefficient on LMAINST is positive and statistically significant in both
columns. Markets with LMAINST equal to one are predicted to have 0.28 additional new-
station LMAs. When the other variables are evaluated at their means, increasing
LMAINST from zero to one increases the probability that a station will form an LMA by
18 percentage points. The significant positive coefficient on HHGROWTH in both
columns indicates that new-station LMAs are also more prevalent in markets with greater
observed profitability.
6. Estimation
Before discussing estimation of the full entry model, I consider a special case of
the model that allows it to be estimated by a probit. Use of the probit to estimate the
entry model requires three assumptions: profits are not affected by the entry decisions of
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other potential stations in the market, there is no correlation in the unobserved component
of profits across stations within the same market ( p = 0), and LMAs are exogenous.
The results from the probit provide a useful benchmark with which to compare
the results of the full model, and are presented in Table 5. The dependent variable is
whether the station enters, and the independent variables are the number of stations in the
market, the station-level variables, the market-level variables, and a constant. Since the
probit model does not allow profits to depend on the entry decisions of other potential
stations in the market, the station variable is equal to the number of incumbent stations in
the market plus one. The second column of Table 5 also includes the number of firms in
the market as an independent variable. This variable is equal to the number of incumbent
firms in the market, plus one if the potential station does not have an LMA. The probits
indicate that LMAs significantly increase the probability of entry, regardless of whether
the coefficient on the number of firms is restricted to zero. When this firm coefficient is
estimated it is positive and insignificant, opposite of what we would expect if LMAs
significantly reduced competition. Hence the probits suggest that LMAs increase
profitability by reducing costs. 
To see whether strategic interaction among potential entrants and the endogeneity
of LMAs affect this result, it is necessary to estimate the full model. When there are
many potential entrants with freely correlated error terms, maximum likelihood
estimation of the full model requires the calculation of many multidimensional integrals.
t The probits were also estimated with a dummy variable indicating whether the station was on the air in
1993. Since stations that are on the air have already incurred the cost of building the station, it is less costly
for them to enter than it is for unbuilt stations. However, since being on the air but inactive may be an
indicator of low profitability, it is also likely that this variable is endogenous. The estimated coefficient for
this variable is negative, small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant. Its inclusion does not affect the
estimates of the other parameters in the model.
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As Berry shows, maximum likelihood estimation is computationally intractable when the
number of potential entrants is even moderately large. Even though many of the markets
in my sample have only a few potential entrants, I face the additional complication that
LMAs are potentially endogenous. Modeling this endogeneity within the maximum
likelihood framework would complicate the error structure even further. However, by
using the method of simulated moments (McFadden 1989, Pakes and Pollard 1989) I can
estimate the model in a straightforward manner.
The basic idea behind the method of simulated moments is to replace expected
values with unbiased estimates of those values that are based on simulation. Given
parameter values and a draw from the error distribution, I solve the entry game in each
market by backwards induction to give the predicted entry decision for each potential
station. I repeat the process 25 times with different draws from the error distribution and
average the predicted entry decisions to get a predicted entry probability for each station,
and also a prediction for the number of stations in each market.
Estimation is then based on
g(zi, ) = 
where v" is the simulated prediction error for the number of stations in market i, and v'
is the simulated prediction error for the entry decision of one of the stations in market i.
Since some markets only have one potential entrant, only one station from each market is
used to form the moment conditions. The station that is selected is the station with the
largest value of HHCOVER.
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The market- and station-level instruments are Z"' and Z'. The station-level
instruments are all the station-level variables, all the market-level variables, and a
constant. The market-level instruments are all the market-level variables, plus the
number of LMAs in the market, the number of VHFs in the market, the maximum values
of HHCOVER, LNPOWER, and HAAT in the market, and a constant.
An initial consistent estimator is obtained by minimizing g (8)' gn (0) using
the Nelder-Mead downhill simplex algorithm, where g () = n g(z, ,) . The efficient
estimator 8 is calculated by minimizing g (0)'Wg (9), where
W =(- g(z,i)g(zi, ) )-.
The variance of a is estimated by
(1 + )(G'WG)- ,
where G = V 9,g, (8) and R is the number of simulation draws (I set R = 25). To calculate
the gradient G numerically, the number of simulation draws is increased to 5000.
7. Results
Estimation results are in Table 6. In the first two columns I impose the restriction
that the coefficient on In(F) is zero, and in the last column I drop this restriction.
Columns 1 and 3 assume that LMAs are exogenous and use the full set of instruments.
Column 2 allows LMAs to be endogenous, dropping both LMA and the number of LMAs
in the market from the instrument list, and replacing them both with LMAINST.
LMAs have a large, statistically significant effect on entry. Evaluating the other
variables at their means, the estimates from Column 1 predict that an LMA increases the
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probability of entry by 84 percentage points, from 0.09 to 0.93. As Column 2 indicates,
accounting for the potential endogeneity of LMAs does not reduce this effect.
Furthermore, the results from Column 3 show that LMAs increase profitability by
reducing costs, not by reducing competition. The coefficient on In(F) is small and
insignificant.
Another way to measure the magnitude of the effect of LMAs on profitability is
by comparison to the effect of additional stations on profitability. This measure also
suggests that the profitability effects of LMAs are substantial. The estimates in Column
1 indicate that an LMA has the same effect on profits as reducing the equilibrium number
of stations from seven to two. 12
The estimates of p all exceed 0.85, and I can reject the hypothesis that p = 0, but
not the hypothesis that p = 1. These results indicate that the market-level component of
unobserved profitability is larger than the station-level component of unobserved
profitability. Note that if p = I it is possible to estimate the model using an ordered
probit on the equilibrium number of stations in each market. However, since there is no
station-specific error term, this model places strong restrictions on the identities of
entering stations that may be rejected by the data. Hence, as Berry notes, the ordered
probit model is inappropriate for analyzing heterogeneity among entrants and the entry
choices of individual stations.
The coefficient estimates for the remaining variables are generally as expected.
Stations that are located closer to more people, more powerful, and have taller
12 The estimated effect of the number of stations may depend on the assumption that profits depend linearly
on In(N). However, when dummy variables for N = 3 through N = 7 are added to the profit equation and
estimated by a probit, the hypothesis that the coefficients on these variables are jointly zero cannot be
rejected.
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transmitters are more profitable. The markets that are more profitable are those that have
faster growth and a larger fraction of population between ages 18 and 49. Profitability
also increases with cable penetration, suggesting that the benefits from cable delivery of
the signal outweigh the costs of losing viewers to cable channels.
The market size results are potentially a bit of a puzzle. Holding the number of
stations constant, we would expect market size to have a strong positive effect on
profitability. Instead, the coefficients on the HOUSEHOLDS variables are estimated
imprecisely, and the point estimates predict a negative relationship between market size
and profitability. One explanation for this result is that market size is obviously
correlated with the number of stations in the market. There may not be sufficient
variation in my instruments to estimate the effect of market size independently from the
effect of the number of stations.
Another explanation for the lack of significance of market size is that market size
is correlated with costs. Costs and market size may be correlated because television
station costs are endogenous. Although the costs of a television station are fixed in that
an additional viewer can watch a station without the station incurring additional costs, it
may be the case that stations can attract additional viewers by spending more money. For
example, by spending more money on anchors, reporters, and production, a station may
be able to attract more viewers to its local newscast. If increases in fixed costs lead to
increases in market share, then the incentives to escalate spending on fixed outlays
increase with market size (Sutton 1991). Some evidence that cost is correlated with
market size comes from a National Association of Broadcasters survey. In 1996, average
annual operating expenses were $37.7 million for stations in the top 10 DMAs, $7.8
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million for stations in DMAs 51-60, and $2.6 million for stations in DMAs 176-211
(National Association Broadcasters 1997). Since cost variables are not included in the
model due to lack of suitable data, this cost effect may be picked up in the market size
variable.
Table 7 compares the entry decisions predicted by the model to actual entry
decisions. The prediction rule is that a station is predicted to enter if its entry probability
is greater than 0.5, based on the estimates from Column 1. The model correctly predicts
87.2 percent of the station entry decisions. This compares to a 78.7 percent correct
prediction rate for the naive prediction rule that no stations enter.
Predictions from the model can be used to evaluate the effects of different policy
approaches that the FCC could have taken with regards to LMAs. Given the large effect
that LMAs have on the predicted entry probability, it is not surprising that changes in the
number of LMAs lead to large changes in the number of predicted entrants. Using the
estimates from Column 1, the model predicts that 48 stations would enter given the
LMAs that actually formed. If the FCC had prohibited LMAs, thereby eliminating the 40
LMAs in the sample, the model predicts that 36 fewer stations would enter, leaving only
12 entrants.
Alternatively, the FCC could have decided to allow LMAs, which likely would
have led to the formation of more LMAs. If there had been one additional LMA formed
in each market, there would have been 129 additional LMAs, for a total of 169.
Compared to the baseline prediction using the actual LMA data, the model predicts that
adding these 129 LMAs would have resulted in 118 to 121 additional stations entering.
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8. Conclusion
This chapter has estimated a model of television station entry in order to
determine the effect of joint ownership on television station costs. I find that stations that
are operated by another station in the same market by means of an LMA are significantly
more likely to enter than stations without LMAs. Instrumenting for LMA formation
using firm-level differences in the propensity to LMA does not diminish this effect,
indicating that LMAs increase profitability. My model allows LMAs to affect profits by
changing both costs and competition, and I find that LMAs increase profits by reducing
costs, not by reducing competition. Although the magnitude of this cost reduction cannot
be estimated using only information on entry, LMAs lead to a substantial increase in the
probability of entry, increasing the entry probability of the average station in the sample
from 0.09 to 0.93.
The results from this chapter provide evidence that the FCC's continued
restrictions on joint ownership prevent the television industry from attaining its cost-
minimizing structure. Hence whether these restrictions are economically justified
depends on the competitive effects of joint ownership. This chapter has studied
competitive effects using the indirect evidence provided by entry decisions. In the next
chapter I look directly at the competitive effects of joint ownership.
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Table 1: Local Marketing Agreements, 1997
DMA
Albuquerque-Santa Fe
Austin
Baltimore
Baton Rouge
Billings
Birmingham
Burlington
Charlotte
Charlotte
Cleveland
Columbus OH
Columbus-Tupelo-West Point
Dallas-Ft. Worth
Dallas-Ft. Worth
Duluth
Erie
Florence-Myrtle Beach
Fresno
Ft. Meyers-Naples
Grand Junction
Grand Rapids-Kalamzoo-Battle Creek
Green Bay-Appleton
Greensboro-High Point-Winston
Salem
Greenville-Spartanburg-Asheville
Greenville-Spartanburg-Asheville
Harrisburg-Lancaster-Lebanon-York
Hartford-New Haven
Hartford-New Haven
Honolulu
Jacksonville
Johnstown-Altoona
Kansas City
Kansas City
Lincoln
Little Rock-Pine Bluff
Louisville
Memphis
Meridian
Milwaukee
Mobile-Pensacola
Mobile-Pensacola
Monterey-Salinas
Nashville
Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News
Omaha
Orlando
Paducah-Cape Girardeau-Harrisburg-
Mt. Vernon
Brokering Stn
13 KRQE
36 KXAN
45 WBFF
44 WGMB
6 KSVI
21 WTTO
5 WPTZ
46 WJZY
9 WSOC
19 WOIO
4 WCMH
9 WTVA
4 KDFW
5 KXAS
6 KBJR
12 WICU
15 WPDE
26 KMPH
20 WBBH
5 KREX
8 WOOD
26 WGBA
45 WXLV
7 WSPA
13 WLOS
21 WHP
30 WVIT
8 WTNH
13 KHNL
30 WAWS
8 WWCP
41 KSHB
9 KMBC
13 KHGI
16 KLRT
41 WDRB
24 WPTY
24 WMDN
24 WCGV
15 WPMI
3 WEAR
35 KCBA
17 WZTV
10 WAVY
42 KPTM
9 WFTV
23 KBSI
Owner
Lee Enterprises
LIN
Sinclair
CCA
Big Horn Comm
Sinclair
Heritage Media
Capitol Broad
Cox
Malrite Comm
Outlet Broad
Spain, Frank
Argyle Television
LIN
Granite
SJL
Vision
Pappas
Waterman Broad
Withers Broad
LIN
Aries Telecomm
Act III
Spartan Comm
River City
Clear Channel
Viacom
LIN
Providence Journal
Clear Channel
U.S. Broadcast Group
Scripps Howard
Hearst
Fant
Clear Channel
Blade Comm
Clear Channel
Spain, Frank
ABRY
Clear Channel
Heritage Media
Ackerley
Sullivan
LIN
Pappas
Cox
Max Media
Brokered Stn
50 KASY
54 KNVA
54 WNUV
33 WVLA
4 KHMT
68 WABM
44 WFFF
55 WFVT
64 WAXN
43 WUAB
53 WWHO
27 WLOV
27 KDFI
39 KXTX
21 KNLD
66 WFXP
21 WWMB
51 KNSO
26 WZVN
4 KFQX
41 WOTV
32 WACY
48 WUPN
62 WASV
40 WFBC
15 WLYH
20 WTXX
59 WBNE
5 KFVE
47 WTEV
23 WATM
38 KMCI
29 KCWB
17 KTVG
38 KASN
58 WFTE
30 WLMT
30 WGBC
18 WVTV
44 WJTC
35 WFGX
46 KCCN
30 WUXP
43 WVBT
15 KXVO
27 WZWY
49 WDKA
LMA Date
Dec-94
Jun-94
Jun-94
Jul-96
Aug-95
Jul-95
Aug-95
Jun-94
Aug-96
Aug-94
Mar-94
May-92
May-94
Jun-94
Aug-94
Aug-96
Apr-94
Jul-97
Jun-94
Apr-94
Nov-91
Jun-94
Jun-95
Type
new
new
exist
exist
new
new
new
new
new
exist
new
exist
exist
exist
new
exist
new
new
exist
new
exist
new
new
Mar-96 new
May-96 new
Nov-95 exist
Jul-93 new
Dec-94 new
May-93 exist
Sep-95 exist
Mar-96 exist
Mar-96 new
Sep-96 new
Apr-94 new
Aug-92 exist
Mar-94 new
Aug-93 exist
Aug-95 new
Mar-93 exist
Mar-93 exist
Mar-96 new
Apr-96 exist
Feb-96 exist
Dec-94 new
Jun-95 new
Oct-94 new
Jun-97 new
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Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland-Auburn
Providence-New Bedford
Providence-New Bedford
Raleigh-Durham
Raleigh-Durham
Reno
Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto
San Antonio
Savannah
Seattle-Tacoma
Shreveport
Spokane
Syracuse
Tucson
Tulsa
Victoria
Waco-Temple-Bryan
Wichita-Hutchinson
3 KTVK
53 WPGH
51 WPXT
12 WPRI
10 WJAR
5 WRAL
22 WLFL
11 KRXI
3 KCRA
29 KABB
22 WJCL
5 KING
33 KMSS
2 KREM
68 WSYT
11 KMSB
23 KOKI
25 KAVU
44 KWKT
24 KSAS
Media America
Sinclair
HMW
Clear Channel
Outlet Broad
Capitol Broad
Sinclair
Cox
Kelly Broad
River City
Lewis Broad
Providence Journal
CCA
Providence Journal
Max Media
Providence Journal
Clear Channel
Withers Broad
CCA
Clear Channel
61 KASW
22 WPTT
35 WPME
64 WNAC
28 WLWC
50 WRAZ
28 WRDC
21 KAME
58 KQCA
35 KRRT
28 WTGS
16 KONG
45 KSHV
22 KSKN
43 WNYS
18 KTTU
41 KTFO
19 KVCT
62 KAKW
36 KWAJ
Dec-94 new
Jan-92 exist
Jan-96 new
Jul-96 exist
Apr-97 new
Jun-94 new
Mar-95 exist
Sep-95 new
Dec-94 exist
Aug-95 exist
Jul-96 exist
May-96 new
Jan-96 new
Jul-96 new
Jul-96 new
Oct-91 exist
Nov-93 new
Jan-95 new
Jan-96 new
Feb-96 new
Note: This list does not include LMAs between stations in different markets, nor LMAs involving satellite
stations (stations that retransmit another station's signal). Information about LMAs was obtained from
responses to FCC Public Notice DA 97-1246 ("Commission Seeks Further Information Regarding
Television LMAs", released 17 June 1997). Responses were filed in MM Docket 91-221, and are available
through the FCC's Electronic Comment Filing System. This information was supplemented by electronic
search of the trade press and local newspapers.
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Table 2: Number of Markets with n Stations of Given Type
Potential Entering Incumbent
n Stations Stations Stations
0 75
1 64 57 2
2 31 9 14
3 16 17
4 6 53
5 9 33
6 5 10
7 5 8
8 1 2
9 1 2
10 0
11 1
141 141 141
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Table 3: Variables
Variable Definition Mean Std dev
LMA LMA indicator 0.1136 0.3178
VHF VHF indicator 0.0625 0.2424
HHCOVER Fraction of households in station's DMA that are 0.5666 0.2756
within 40 miles of station's tower
LNPOWER Natural log of station's authorized power, in 6.9896 1.7064
kilowatts
HAAT Height above average terrain of station's 1.1736 0.7368
transmitter, in thousands of feet
HOUSEHOLDS Number of households, in millions 1.1568 1.3659
HHGROWTH Projected growth in number of households, 0.0588 0.0380
1997-2002
HHINCOME Average household income, in tens of thousands 4.2171 0.6709
AGE1849 Fraction of population in 18-49 age group 0.4741 0.0295
CABLEPEN. Fraction of households subscribing to cable 0.6681 0.0791
SPILLOVER Viewing share of stations from other markets 0.0249 0.0658
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Table 4: LMA Formation Regressions
Column 1 dependent variable:
Column 2 dependent variable:
Variable
LMAINST
NUMVHFS
MAXHHCOVER
MAXLNPOWER
MAXHAAT
VHF
HHCO VER
LNPOWER
HAAT
HOUSEHOLDS
HOUSEHOLDSA2
HHGROWTH
HHINCOME
AGE1849
CABLEPEN
SPILLOVER
CONSTANT
Num. obs.
R2 /Log likelihood
F-tpQt/ 2 tQt n-XlI.
Number of new-station LMAs in market
Indicator for whether station has LMA
Column 1 Column 2
OLS Probit
0.2795 1.0550
(0.0864) (0.3530)
0.1257
(0.1028)
-0.1482
(0.2101)
0.0179
(0.0291)
0.0367
(0.0632)
0.2635
(0.6749)
0.0470
(0.7819)
-0.1302
(0.1011)
-0.2185
(0.2538)
-0.1429 -0.6580
(0.1542) (0.9458)
0.0151 0.0651
(0.0239) (0.3999)
1.9859 9.6006
(1.2104) (4.1362)
-0.0221 -0.1578
(0.1082) (0.4088)
1.5695 4.0537
(1.6846) (6.0748)
0.3392 0.2430
(0.5830) (2.1481)
0.0833 -1.5782
(0.5676) (2.4023)
-0.8513 -2.2956
(0.8482) (2.8192)
141 141
0.1531 -47.6028
0.0366 0.0683
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The sample for Column 2 consists of the 141
stations whose predicted entry decisions are used to form moment conditions in the
simulation estimator.
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Table 5: Entry Probits
Dependent variable: Station-entry indicator
Variable
ln(N)
In(F)
LMA
VHF
HHCOVER
LNPOWER
HAA T
HOUSEHOLDS
HO USEHOLDSA2
HHGROWTH
HHINCOME
AGE1849
CABLEPEN
SPILLOVER
CONSTANT
Log likelihood
Num. obs.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For this table only, N is the number of incumbent
stations in the market plus one, and F is the number of incumbent firms in the market
plus one, minus LMA.
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Column 1
-2.3772
(0.6979)
Column 2
-2.7285
(1.1164)
0.4241
(1.0476)
2.2611
(0.3931)
0.3412
(0.4096)
0.3032
(0.4134)
0.0653
(0.0666)
0.3027
(0.1384)
0.0840
(0.4195)
-0.0326
(0.0774)
2.3774
(2.8785)
-0.1735
(0.2797)
14.9436
(4.9974)
2.0569
(1.3506)
- 1.4276
(1.7309)
-6.0560
(2.2981)
-114.8485
352
2.1540
(0.2871)
0.3431
(0.4103)
0.3133
(0.4124)
0.0667
(0.0666)
0.3031
(0.1386)
0.1264
(0.4063)
-0.0371
(0.0768)
2.3464
(2.8778)
-0.1913
(0.2768)
15.0126
(5.0111)
2.0190
(1.3462)
-1.6267
(1.6633)
-5.9195
(2.2756)
-114.9297
352
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Table 6: Simulation Estimates
Variable Column I
In(N) -2.3077
(0.2845)
ln(F)
LMA
VHF
HHCOVER
LNPOWER
HAAT
HOUSEHOLDS
HOUSEHOLDSA2
HHGROWTH
HHINCOME
AGE1849
CABLEPEN
SPILLOVER
CONSTANT
P
2.8508
(0.3814)
0.5847
(0.4548)
0.4022
(0.2964)
0.1370
(0.0795)
0.3242
(0.1488)
-0.1920
(0.2000)
0.0069
(0.0254)
6.6459
(2.3236)
0.2621
(0.2422)
10.0422
(2.1568)
3.0318
(0.6885)
-2.3074
(3.7391)
-6.7830
(0.4084)
0.8655
(0.1369)
Column 2
-2.2915
(0.2363)
2.8762
(0.6059)
0.6344
(0.5224)
0.5282
(0.2108)
0.1391
(0.0729)
0.3293
(0.1125)
-0.0704
(0.1513)
-0.0089
(0.0529)
6.5112
(1.3086)
0.2306
(0.2610)
10.0679
(2.1914)
3.0586
(0.6372)
-2.3560
(0.3646)
-6.8768
(0.4222)
0.8652
(0.2046)
Column 3
-2.1917
(0.2077)
0.0035
(0.2249)
2.8299
(0.2941)
0.6079
(0.4534)
0.5111
(0.2277)
0.1223
(0.0569)
0.3000
(0.1691)
-0.1045
(0.2076)
-0.0032
(0.0143)
6.6986
(2.0582)
0.1983
(0.2441)
10.2620
(2.6160)
3.1772
(0.5933)
-2.3139
(0.9571)
-6.8763
(0.4313)
0.8731
(0.1533)
objective function 11.7191 11.7385 11.3118
degree of 11 11 10
overidentification
p-value for 0.3851 0.3836 0.3338
overidentification test
Notes: Observations are 141 markets.
additional variance due to simulation.
Column 2 treats LMA as endogenous.
Standard errors
Columns 1 and
are in parentheses, and account for
3 treat LMA as exogenous;
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Table 7: Actual vs. Predicted Entry
Not predicted to enter Predicted to enter
Did not enter 268 9
Entered 36 39
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Chapter 2
The Competitive Effects of Broadcast Television Station Mergers
1. Introduction
In 1999 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) relaxed its prohibition
against one firm owning two television stations in the same local market. This decision
has resulted in a number of mergers between large station groups, including CBS-Viacom
and News Corp.-Chris Craft. In evaluating the FCC's local ownership policy, it is
necessary to consider at least two possible effects of mergers: cost effects, and market
power effects. Chapter 1 focuses on the cost effects and finds that joint operation of two
television stations in the same market leads to significant cost reductions. This chapter
focuses on the potential market power effects of television station mergers. As in
Chapter 1, I use the experience with local marketing agreements (LMAs) to provide
evidence on the effects of joint operation.
I look for anticompetitive effects in two markets in which television stations
operate: the advertising market and the programming market. In the advertising market,
stations sell time to advertisers. If a merger reduces competition among stations, then the
price of advertising may increase. To look for this effect, I collect data on the price of
advertising in 166 television markets from 1993 to 1998. I find that, in general, joint
operation of television stations in the same market does not lead to significant increases
in the price of advertising. However, due to differences in viewer demographics,
television stations may be differentiated products in the eyes of advertisers, with some
stations being closer substitutes than others. Hence I also consider whether different
types of mergers (as measured by the network affiliations of the stations involved in the
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merger) have different price effects. When I allow for this possibility, I find that mergers
between stations likely to be particularly close substitutes lead to significant price
increases. For example, a typical merger between major-network affiliates is predicted to
increase the price of advertising by over ten percent.
Television station mergers may also affect the programming market. In the
programming market, television stations provide programming to viewers. If stations
that compete for viewers merge, they may reduce their expenditures on program quality.
However, mergers may also reduce the cost of providing quality programming.
Furthermore, mergers may also increase the variety of programming. To determine the
net effect of mergers on the programming market I look at the effect of mergers on
market-level and station-level ratings. I find little evidence that joint operation reduces
ratings. Instead, I find that LMAs increase the ratings of stations involved in the LMA,
which suggests that mergers have beneficial effects in the programming market.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the
relevant features of the television industry. Section 3 reviews the previous literature.
Sections 4 and 5 study the effects of mergers in the advertising and programming
markets, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Television Industry
2.1 Overview
Commercial broadcast television stations are in the business of selling viewers to
advertisers. Television stations sell two types of advertising: national spot (ads sold to
national and regional advertisers), and local spot (ads sold to local advertisers). For both
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types of advertising the price is determined through negotiations between buyers and
sellers. Factors that may affect advertising prices include audience size, audience
demographics, and competition from other suppliers of advertising, such as other
television stations, newspapers, radio, and cable.
One of the primary determinants of the size and demographics of a station's
audience is that station's programming. Most stations obtain programming through their
affiliations with national networks. The three largest networks are ABC, CBS, and NBC,
which have affiliates in almost every market in the United States. The Fox network,
established in 1986, has also obtained close to national coverage. Two smaller networks,
UPN and WB, started in 1995. Independent stations (those that are not network
affiliates) broadcast locally produced programs and programs obtained from syndication
companies. Since the networks do not provide a full broadcast schedule, affiliates
broadcast some syndicated and locally produced programs as well.
The geographic markets used in the television industry are Nielsen's Designated
Market Areas (DMAs). DMAs are based on county-level viewing patterns, and are the
markets used in negotiations between stations, advertisers, and programmers. In 1999
there were 210 DMAs in the United States.
2.2 The Local Ownership Rule and Local Marketing Agreements
For most of the history of television, the FCC's local ownership rule has
prohibited common ownership of television stations in the same local market. In 1991
the FCC began a proceeding to consider changes to the local ownership rule, and in
August 1999 the rule was revised (Federal Communications Commission 1999a). Under
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the new rule, common ownership of two stations in the same DMA is allowed if at least
eight independently owned stations remain after the merger and at least one of the
stations is not among the top four stations in the market, based on audience share.
Although mergers were technically prohibited, in the early 1990s television
station owners began using contractual arrangements known as local marketing
agreements (LMAs) to operate two stations in the same market. The first LMAs appeared
in 1991, and by 1998 there were over 70 LMAs in existence (see Table 1). In a typical
LMA, the licensee of the brokered station leases the majority of its broadcast time to the
owner of the brokering station. The brokering station pays a fee to the brokered station,
and in return it supplies the programming, sells the advertising, and retains all the
advertising revenue. LMA stations typically share facilities and personnel. LMAs are
long-term agreements, generally running from five to ten years and containing options for
renewal. LMAs have been regarded in the industry as essentially defacto mergers, and
the Department of Justice has treated LMAs as equivalent to mergers with respect to the
Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting period (Klein 1997, p. 22). Hence the experience with LMAs
can be used to provide evidence on the competitive effects of television station mergers.
Low-power television (LPTV) stations provide an additional source of evidence
on the effects of joint ownership. The local television ownership rule does not apply to
LPTV stations, so it is legal for a broadcaster to own a full power station and a LPTV
station in the same market. Although most LPTV stations are noncommercial, in some
markets LPTV stations are network affiliates with significant levels of ratings and
revenue. A listing of LPTVs that are jointly owned with full power stations in the same
market is in Table 2.
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3. Previous Literature
Other than Chapter 1, the competitive effects of television LMAs have not been
studied previously. However, there are several papers that study the cross-sectional
relationship between concentration and advertising prices in the television industry.
These studies have generally failed to find strong evidence that advertising prices are
higher in markets with higher concentration. Fournier and Martin (1983), using
transaction prices from 1977, find no evidence that advertising prices are increasing in
concentration. Wirth and Wollert (1984) report that the list price for commercials on
local news shows in 1978 increases with concentration. However, Wirth and Wollert do
not control for audience size in their regressions. Since there is likely to be a positive
correlation both between price and audience size and between audience size and
concentration, their results may reflect omitted variables bias. A similar difficulty in
distinguishing the effects of audience size and concentration may also affect the results of
Wirth and Bloch (1985), who find a positive relationship between concentration and list
prices for a sample of CBS affiliates in 1982. The most recent study of the issue
(Webster and Phalen 1997, Chapter 3) uses 1993 data and finds no relationship between
the estimated advertising price and the number of television stations in the market.
The relationship between market structure and program quality has not been
studied as extensively. Although Fournier (1985) focuses on a different question, he also
provides some evidence on the quality-concentration relationship. Fournier studies
stations' reported programming expenses, which are proxies for program quality. Using
45
data from 1977, Fournier finds no evidence that programming expenses are affected by
market concentration.
A limitation of almost all of these studies is the potential endogeneity of
concentration. If unobserved cost and demand factors that affect concentration also
affect price, then OLS estimates of the relationship between price and concentration will
be biased.' The one study that does consider the potential endogeneity problem is
Fournier and Martin (1983). They argue that since FCC licensing restrictions place
binding constraints on the number of stations in each market, it is reasonable to assume
that the number of stations is exogenous. However, since there were unused television
licenses in some markets even in the 1990s, this assumption may not be valid.
The existence of LMAs means I do not have to rely on cross-sectional variation in
concentration to draw inferences about the effects of mergers. Instead, since LMAs do
not form in all markets and LMAs form at different times, I use panel data to estimate the
effects of joint operation controlling for fixed effects both across markets and over time.
This approach has been used previously to study the price effects of mergers in the airline
industry (Kim and Singal 1993) and banking industry (Prager and Hannan 1998).
4. Advertising Market Effects
4.1 Empirical Strategy
To determine the price effects of mergers I estimate regressions of the form
In PRICEit = MERGERVARSi, + /MARKETSTRUCTURE,, + 7X,, + /, + v, + £,,.
'See Evans, Froeb, and Werden (1993).
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MERGERVARS includes variables that measure the effects of mergers, and
MARKETSTRUCTURE includes variables that measure the underlying market structure
(e.g., number of stations in the market). X includes variables that vary across markets
and over time, ,u andr are market and year fixed effects, and £ is an error term assumed
orthogonal to the rest of the model.
I take two different approaches to specifying the variables that are included in
MERGERVARS and MARKETSTRUCTURE, which I will refer to as the Herfindahl-based
approach and the numbers-based approach. In the Herfindahl-based approach I
decompose the Herfindahl into two components according to the following equation:
= H base + AH,
H base, the baseline Herfindahl, is the Herfindahl that results from the assumption that
each station is operated separately. Changes in H base reflect changes in concentration
due to factors other than mergers, such as entry. AH is the increase in the Herfindahl that
results from two stations being jointly operated by a single firm. Changes in AH reflect
the formation of LMAs and changes in the market shares of LMA stations. From the
Herfindahl formula, AH is equal to twice the product of the market shares of the jointly
operated stations.
The standard justification for the use of the Herfindahl index in studying the price
effects of mergers is that in a homogenous-product Cournot setting, the price change
resulting from a merger is a function of the change in the Herfindahl (Cowling and
Waterson 1976; Ordover, Sykes, and Willig 1982). Although homogenous product
Cournot may not be an accurate model of competition in television advertising, Willig
(1991) shows that market shares can also be a valid predictor of price effects of mergers
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in differentiated-products price-setting industries. However, as Willig notes, market
shares provide an accurate prediction of price effects only in logit-type demand systems,
where all products are equally close. If competition is localized, then market shares will
either under-predict or over-predict the price effects of the merger, depending on whether
the merging products are close together or far apart (see Hausman, Leonard, and Zona
(1992) for a discussion of this point and Hausman and Leonard (1997) for an empirical
example). Accordingly, I also examine whether different types of mergers (as measured
by the network affiliations of the merging stations) have different effects on price.
Network affiliation is the primary observable product characteristic of a television
station. One of the dimensions along which the networks are differentiated is the age of
their viewers. The three established networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) tend to have the
oldest viewers, while the newer networks have younger viewers.2 To allow different
types of mergers to have different effects on price, I divide stations into three categories
based on their affiliation: BIG3, FOX, and IND. BIG3 is comprised of ABC, CBS, and
NBC affiliates. IND includes independent stations as well as UPN and WB affiliates.3
Based on these categories there are five possible types of merger: BIG3-BIG3, BIG3-
FOX, BIG3-IND, FOX-IND, and IND-IND. If competition is localized within these
categories, then within-category mergers may have larger price effects than between-
category mergers.
As an alternative to the Herfindahl-based approach, which imposes the restriction
that the effect of the merger is proportional to the product of the shares of the merged
2 In 1997, the prime-time median age for each network was as follows: ABC 40.8, CBS 52.6, NBC 40.3,
Fox 32.8, UPN 31.7, WB 24.2 (Webster, Phalen, and Lichty 2000. p. 203).
3 UPN and WB affiliates are placed in the independent category because respectively they provided only 6
and 7 hours of prime time programming per week in 1997.
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stations, I also specify the MERGERVARS and MARKETSTRUCTURE variables using a
numbers-based approach. In the numbers-based approach MERGERVARS includes
variables indicating the number and type of mergers in the market, and
MARKETSTRUCTURE includes variables indicating the number and type of stations in
the market.
4.2 Data
Since transaction prices are not publicly available in the television industry, I use
cost projections from the Media Market Guide to measure prices. Using actual
transactions that are submitted confidentially by advertising agencies, the Guide
estimates the average CPM (cost per thousand) for each DMA. Media buyers use these
estimates for planning and budgeting ad campaigns. The measure of price I use is the
household prime-time DMA CPM, which is the price of a prime-time 30-second
television ad divided by the number (in thousands) of households in the DMA viewing
the ad.4 To measure price at the end of year t, I use the first quarter edition of the Guide
for year t+l, which is based on data collected through the fourth quarter of year t.
The Herfindahl for market i in year t is calculated as
Htt "! rrevenueit'
f mktrevenuei
where revenued is the revenue of television firmf and mktrevenuei, is the revenue of all
television firms in the market.5 LMA stations are counted as being part of the same firm
if the LMA was formed by the end of the third quarter of year t. It is important to note
4 Prime time is the part of the day with the highest viewing levels: 8 PM - 11 PM in the Eastern and Pacific
time zones, and an hour earlier in the Central and Mountain time zones.
s Revenues from non-English-language stations are excluded in constructing the Herfindahl.
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that there is evidence that television stations face competition from other providers of
advertising, such as radio and newspapers.6 Although I do not include these other
competitors due to lack of revenue data, using panel data should help control for
differences in true concentration across markets.
As noted above, I decompose the Herfindahl into two components, HBASE and
AH . HBASE is Herfindahl that results from treating all stations as separately owned, and
AH is the increase in the Herfindahl due to the joint operation of stations. To allow
different types of mergers to have different price effects, I replace AH with five
variables indicating the increase in the Herfindahl due to each type of merger:
AHBIG3BIG3, AHBIG3FOX, AHBIG3IND, AHFOXIND, and AHINDIND.
For the numbers-based approach the variables MERGER and 2MERGERS capture
the effect of mergers. MERGER is an indicator for markets with at least one merger, and
2MERGERS is an indicator for markets with two mergers. I allow different types of
mergers to have different price effects by replacing MERGER with indicator variables for
each type of merger: BIG3BIG3, BIG3FOX, BIG3IND, FOXIND, and INDIND. I
measure baseline market structure using indicator variables for the number and type of
active stations in the market. 2BIG3 and 3BIG3 are indicators for the number of Big
Three affiliates in the market, FOX is an indicator for whether there is a Fox affiliate in
the market, and IND, 2IND, and 3IND are indicators for the number of independent
stations in the market (including UPN and WB affiliates).7
6 Ekelund, Ford, and Jackson (2000) find significant cross-price elasticities between the demand for
television advertising and the prices of radio and newspaper advertising. Based on their estimate of the
own-price elasticity of demand for television advertising, they conclude that local television advertising is
not a relevant antitrust market.
7 I define a station as active in a given year if its average household share during the four sweeps months is
at least one. Non-English-language stations are excluded.
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I include several variables that may also affect the price of advertising.
CABLEPEN is the fraction of homes subscribing to cable television as of November of
each year. While increased cable penetration may mean that broadcast stations face
increased competition from cable operators, it may also reduce the supply of broadcast
viewers. I also include several variables that control for differences in advertisers'
valuations of viewers. Since advertisers may be willing to pay more for viewers with
higher incomes I include In(INCOME), the natural log of average household income.
Since advertisers' valuations may depend on the ages of viewers, I include AGE1849, the
fraction of population in the 18 to 49 age range. In light of recent FCC concerns about
"minority discounts" in broadcast advertising, I also include BLACK, the fraction of the
population that is black.8 A final variable that may affect valuation is the quality of
information that advertisers have when purchasing spots. In approximately 40 of the
largest markets Nielsen measures household viewing by attaching electronic meters to a
sample of television sets. In the remaining markets Nielsen relies on diaries kept by a
sample of viewers. Meters may provide better information about viewing than diaries,
and this distinction is captured by the indicator variable METERED.
The sample consists of all DMAs with revenue data available for all years. I
exclude DMAs with significant spillover from adjacent markets (defined as DMAs for
which the ratio of out-of-DMA viewing to in-DMA viewing exceeds 0.4 during any
year). The resulting sample consists of 166 DMAs. In the time dimension I have five
years of data (1993, 1995-1998).9 Means and standard deviations are in Table 3.
8 Ofori (1999), in a study sponsored by the FCC, finds that minority-targeted radio stations receive less
revenue per listener than other stations.
9 I was unable to collect revenue data for 1994.
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4.3 Results
Table 4 presents the results of regressions using the Herfindahl-based measures of
mergers and market structure. In column 1 all types of mergers are constrained to have
the same effect on price while columns 2 and 3 relax this constraint. Results for the
control variables are similar across columns. The year variables indicate a general rise in
price from 1993 to 1998. The only significant control variables are CABLEPEN and
METERED. During this time period increases in cable penetration are associated with
increases in the price of broadcast advertising, with a ten percentage-point increase in
cable penetration increases the price of advertising by about 13 percent. Using meters
rather than diaries to measure ratings also increases prices, by about five percent.
When different types of mergers are constrained to have the same effect on price
there is no evidence that mergers increase price. In column 1 the coefficient on AH is
statistically insignificant and its economic magnitude is small as well. Using the point
estimate, an increase in the Herfindahl due to merger of 0.05 (equivalent to moving from
five to four equally sized firms) is predicted to increase price by less than 1.5 percent.
However, the results from columns 2 and 3 suggest that different types of mergers
have different price effects. In column 2, mergers between stations in different affiliate
categories (BIG3-FOX, BIG3-IND, and FOX-IND) all have a statistically insignificant
effect on price. However, mergers between stations in the same affiliate category (BIG3-
BIG3 and IND-IND) both have a statistically significant effect on price. Since a Wald
test does not reject the joint hypothesis that (i) the coefficient on A HBIG3BIG3 equals
the coefficient on A HINDIND and (ii) the coefficients on A HBIG3FOX, A HBIG3IND,
and AHFOXIND are all equal, I impose these restrictions in column 3. The variable
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A HSAME is the change in the Herfindahl due to mergers between stations in the same
affiliate category, and is equal to the sum of A HBIG3BIG3 and AHINDIND. The
variable A HDIFF is the change in the Herfindahl due to mergers between stations in
different affiliate categories, and is equal to the sum of AHBIG3FOX, AHBIG3IND, and
A HFOXIND.
The results from column 3 indicate that only mergers between stations in the same
affiliate category increase the price of advertising. According to the estimated coefficient
on AHSAME, a merger between two Big Three affiliates, each with a 20 percent market
share, is predicted to increase price by 12.2 percent. Independent stations generally have
smaller market shares than Big Three stations. A merger between independents with
market shares of five and ten percent (so that the increase in the Herfindahl is 0.01) is
predicted to increase price by only 1.5 percent. There is no evidence that mergers
between stations in different affiliate categories increase price, as the coefficient on
AHDIFF is negative and statistically insignificant.
Table 5 presents results from the numbers-based approach, which generally
confirm the results from the Herfindahl-based approach. As column 1 indicates, when all
mergers are constrained to have the same effect the estimated price effect is small and
statistically insignificant. When different types of mergers are allowed to have different
price effects, as in column 2, only mergers between Big Three affiliates are estimated to
have a positive, statistically significant effect on price. The coefficient on BIG3BIG3
indicates that this type of merger increases price by over 15 percent. The coefficient on
INDIND indicates a smaller price effect (less than 4 percent) and is estimated
imprecisely. The remaining types of mergers are estimated to have either small and
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statistically insignificant price effects or negative price effects in the case of the second
Big Three-independent merger in a market.
The results for the baseline market structure variables in the numbers-based
approach generally make sense. Entry by a third Big Three affiliate reduces price, as
does the entry of a Fox affiliate. The only anomalous result is that entry by a second
independent station is associated with a significant increase in price.
Since it is possible that both the presence of a merger and the market shares of the
merged stations affect price, I also estimate regressions that include both the numbers-
based and Herfindahl-based merger variables. However, when all of these variables
( AHBIG3BIG3 through AHINDIND and BIG3BIG3 through INDIND) are included, the
precision with which their coefficients are estimated drops and they become individually
statistically insignificant. Hence there is insufficient variation in the data to separate the
two effects.
5. Programming Market Effects
5.1 Empirical Strategy
Mergers may affect both the quality and variety of programming that stations
offer. If stations use expenditures on program quality to compete for viewers, then a
merger between stations that compete for viewers may lead those stations to choose a
lower level of quality.' ° However, mergers may also reduce the cost of providing quality
programming. For example, many of the costs of producing local programming (such as
local news) are fixed. Since mergers allow stations to share these fixed costs they may
lead to an increase in the amount of local programming, which may be of higher quality.
10 See Fournier (1985) for a formal model of quality competition in which a merger would have this effect.
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Mergers may also affect the variety of programming, as was first noted by Steiner
(1952) in the context of the radio industry. In the Steiner model the audience is
composed of groups that prefer different types of programs. If two stations compete, they
may both select the program type favored by the largest audience group. However, if the
two stations merge the second station may be programmed differently in order to reach a
different audience group. Empirical support for the Steiner model comes from Berry and
Waldfogel (2001), who find evidence that mergers increase variety in the radio industry.
Since it is difficult to measure the quality and variety of television programming,
to study the programming market effects of mergers I use the implicit information about
quality and variety contained in the audience's viewing choices.1t Since broadcast
television is free, television ratings reflect the quantity of programming demanded at a
price of zero. Holding price constant, changes in ratings should reflect changes in both
the quality and variety of television programming available in the market. Hence to
determine the programming effects of mergers, I look at the effects of mergers on both
market-level and station-level ratings.
5.2 Data
The market-level ratings variable is MKTRATING, which is the average
percentage of households in the DMA watching local commercial English-language
broadcast stations from 9 AM until midnight during the month of November. To
measure the effect of mergers on ratings I use the same Herfindahl-based and numbers-
based approaches as in the price regressions. The market-level ratings regressions
include three additional variables that may also affect viewing. INCOME allows
' A previous study that uses ratings as an implicit measure of quality is Parkman (1982).
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broadcast television viewing to be a normal or inferior good. METERED controls for the
possibility that people underreport their viewing when keeping diaries. Since in markets
with higher cable penetration viewers have more non-broadcast viewing options, I also
include CABLEPEN. The sample for the market-level regressions is the same 166
markets used in the price regressions.
The station-level ratings variable is STNRATING, which is the percentage of
households in the market watching a given station. Several variables capture the effect of
mergers on station-level ratings. BROKERING and BROKERED are indicator variables
for the brokering and brokered station in each LMA. LMACOMP measures the effect of
LMAs on stations that compete in the same market. For station i in market M, this
variable is defined as
LMACOMPi = LMAsM - BROKERINGi - BROKERED i
NUMSTNi - 2
where LMAsM is the number of LMAs in market M and NUMSTN is the number of
stations in market M. LMACOMP assumes that LMAs have an equal effect on all other
stations in the market, and is defined so that it sums to the number of LMAs in the
market. Hence the coefficient on this variable gives the total effect of an LMA on the
ratings of competing stations. The analogous variables that capture the ratings effects of
joint ownership of full-power and low-power stations are FPJOINT, LPJOINT, and
FPLPCOMP.
The control variables in the station-level ratings regression include both market
and station characteristics that affect ratings (see Table 6 for definitions and summary
statistics). The sample consists of all stations with non-zero November ratings in DMAs
without significant spillover from adjacent markets. Data are from the years 1993
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through 1998, excluding 1994. The resulting sample consists of 4018 observations on
869 stations.
5.3 Results
Table 7 presents results for the market-level ratings regressions using the
Herfindahl-based measures of market structure. Column 1 restricts all types of mergers
to have the same effect on ratings, while columns 2 and 3 relax this restriction. Results
for the non-merger variables are similar across specifications. The coefficient on HBASE
indicates that broadcast ratings increase with the number of stations. Moving from four
to five equally sized stations increases ratings by about 0.25 percentage points. A ten
percentage point increase in cable penetration decreases broadcast ratings by about 0.9
percentage points. Metering increases ratings by over five percentage points. Broadcast
television viewing is an inferior good: increasing household income by $5000 reduces
ratings by about 0.5 percentage points. The year indicators reflect the general erosion in
broadcast viewing during this period.
There is no evidence from any of the specifications in Table 7 that mergers reduce
market-level ratings. The coefficient on A H in column 1 is positive, close to zero, and
statistically insignificant. In column 2, the only statistically significant coefficient is
on A HINDIND, and this coefficient indicates that this type of merger increases ratings.
In column 3, I replace AHBIG3BIG3 and AHINDIND with A HSAME, and
AHBIG3FOX, AHBIG31ND, and AHFOXIND with AHDIFF (a Wald test does not
reject the joint hypothesis implied by these restrictions).
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According to the results from column 3, while mergers between stations in
different affiliate categories do not significantly affect ratings, mergers between stations
in the same affiliate categories are associated with increases in market-level ratings. The
coefficient on AHSAME implies that a typical merger between Big Three affiliates (i.e.,
one that increases the Herfindahl index by 0.08) increases market-level ratings by about
1.2 percentage points. A typical merger between independent stations (one that increases
the Herfindahl by 0.01) increases market-level ratings by 0.15 percentage points.
Results using numbers-based measures, reported in Table 8, generally confirm the
results obtained using Herfindahl-based measures. Mergers between Big Three affiliates
are estimated to increase market-level ratings by 1.34 percentage points. One difference
from the Herfindahl-based results is that a Big Three-independent merger is estimated to
reduce market-level ratings, by about 0.7 percentage points. However, the addition of a
second Big-Three independent merger in a market is not estimated to lead to further
ratings losses. Overall, the market-level results provide little support for the hypothesis
that mergers reduce ratings.
Table 9 reports results from the station-level ratings regression, which includes
both station and year fixed effects. These results reinforce the market-level results. As
before, ratings increase with metering and decrease with income and cable penetration.
However, both cable penetration and metering affect the ratings of different types of
stations differently. While a ten percentage point increase in cable penetration decreases
the ratings of a VHF station by about 0.8 percentage points, it increases the ratings of
UHF and low-power stations: UHF ratings go up by 1.2 percentage points, and low-
power ratings go up by 2.5 percentage points. Since UHF and low-power stations have
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weaker broadcast signals than VHF stations, these results suggest that cable carriage
helps UHF and low-power stations deliver their signals. Metering has different ratings
effects depending on whether a station is affiliated with one of the Big Three networks
(ABC, CBS, and NBC). For stations not affiliated with the Big Three networks, metering
increases ratings by about 1.2 percentage points, while for Big Three affiliates metering
increases ratings by only 0.9 percentage points. This result is in line with the
conventional wisdom in the industry that diary-keepers are less likely to record their
viewing of smaller stations. In general, network affiliates have higher ratings than
independent stations, with the Big Three networks having the highest ratings, the two
new networks the lowest, and Fox in the middle.
Consistent with the market-level results, the station-level results suggest that
mergers may actually increase ratings. For stations that are involved in LMAs as
brokered stations, which have an average rating of 1.7 percent, the results indicate that
LMAs increase ratings by 0.25 percentage points. The total effect of LMAs on market
ratings, obtained by summing the coefficients on BROKERING, BROKERED, and
LMACOMP, is positive but not significantly different from zero. Results for full-
power/low-power combinations are similar, but less precisely estimated.l2
6. Conclusion
This chapter has studied the competitive effects of television station mergers
using the evidence provided by LMAs. In the advertising market I find that most mergers
12 Alternative specifications of the station-level ratings regression lead to similar results. The hypothesis
that different types of mergers (within-category vs. between-category) have the same effect on ratings
cannot be rejected. Replacing II/NUMSTN with indicators for the number and type of stations in the market
does not affect the coefficients and standard errors for the merger-related variables.
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do not lead to significant increases in the price of advertising. However, mergers
between stations that are likely to be close substitutes are associated with increases in
price. In the programming market I find little evidence that mergers have anticompetitive
effects. Instead I find that LMAs increase the ratings of brokered stations, which
suggests that mergers may increase the quality and variety of the programming of
merging stations.
The results of Chapters 1 and 2 can be used to evaluate FCC policy towards joint
ownership of television stations in the same market. Under the current local ownership
rule, mergers are permitted only if at least eight independently operated television firms
remain in the market after the merger, and mergers among the top four stations in the
market are prohibited in any size market. These continued restrictions prohibit many
mergers from occurring. In 1999, 155 of the 210 television markets in the U.S. had eight
stations or fewer, which means that no mergers are permitted in those markets. Only 38
markets had a sufficient number of stations for two mergers to be allowed. According to
my results, many of these currently prohibited mergers would reduce costs and increase
ratings without significantly increasing advertising prices. Although study of the post-
1999 mergers should be undertaken to confirm these results, it appears that further
relaxation of the FCC's local ownership rule may be warranted.
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Table 1: Local Marketing Agreements
DMA
Albuquerque-Santa Fe
Austin
Bakersfield
Baltimore
Baton Rouge
Billings
Birmingham
B urlington-Plattsburgh
Charleston SC
Charleston-Huntington
Charlotte
Charlotte
Cleveland
Columbus-Tupelo-West Point
Columbus OH
Columbus OH
Dallas-Ft. Worth
Dallas-Ft. Worth
Dayton
El Paso
Erie
Erie
Florence-Myrtle Beach
Fresno-Visalia
Fresno-Visalia
Ft. Meyers-Naples
Grand Rapids-Kalamzoo-Battle
Creek
Green Bay-Appleton
Greensboro-High Point-Winston
Salem
Greenville-Spartanburg-Asheville
Greenville-Spartanburg-Asheville
Harrisburg-Lancaster-Lebanon-
York
Hartford-New Haven
Hartford-New Haven
Hartford-New Haven
Honolulu
Idaho Falls-Pocatello
Jacksonville
Johnstown-Altoona
Kansas City
Kansas City
Las Vegas
Lincoln
Little Rock-Pine Bluff
Louisville
Memphis
Brokering Station
13 KRQE
36 KXAN
29 KBAK
45 WBFF
44 WGMB
6 KSVI
21 WTTO
5 WPTZ
36 WMMP
8 WCHS
46 WJZY
9 WSOC
19 WOIO
9 WTVA
4 WCMH
28 WTTE
4 KDFW
5 KXAS
22 WKEF
9 KTSM
12 WICU
24 WJET
15 WPDE
26 KMPH
26 KMPH
20 WBBH
8 WOOD
Affiliation Brokered Station
CBS
NBC
CBS
FOX
NBC
ABC
FOX/UPN
NBC
UPN
ABC
UPN
ABC
CBS
NBC
NBC
ABC
FOX
NBC
NBC
NBC
NBC
ABC
ABC
FOX
FOX
NBC
NBC
26 WGBA NBC
45 WXLV ABC
7 WSPA
13 WLOS
21 WHP
30 WVIT
61 WTIC
8 WTNH
13 KHNL
6 KPVI
30 WAWS
8 WWCP
41 KSHB
9 KMBC
21 KVWB
13 KHGI
16 KLRT
41 WDRB
24 WPTY
50 KASY
54 KNVA
58 KMPH-LP
54 WNUV
33 WVLA
4 KHMT
68 WABM
44 WFFF
24 WTAT
11 WVAH
55 WFVT
64 WAXN
43 WUAB
27 WLOV
53 WWHO
6 WSYX
27 KDFI
39 KXTX
45 WRGT
65 KKWB
66 WFXP
66 WFXP
21 WWMB
43 KGMC
51 KNSO
26 WZVN
41 WOTV
Affiliation
UPN
WB
FOX
UPN/WB
FOX
FOX
UPN/WB
FOX
FOX
FOX
WB
IND
UPN
ABC/FOX
WB
FOX
IND
INC
FOX
WB
FOX
FOX
UPN
WB
WB
ABC
ABC
32 WACY UPN
48 WUPN UPN
CBS
ABC
CBS
NBC
FOX
ABC
FOX
NBC
FOX
ABC
NBC
ABC
WB
ABC
FOX
FOX
FOX/ABC
62 WASV
40 WFBC
15 WLYH
20 WTXX
20 WTXX
59 WBNE
5 KFVE
31 KFXP
47 WTEV
23 WATM
38 KMCI
29 KCWB
33 KFBT
17 KTVG
38 KASN
58 WFTE
30 WLMT
WB
IND
UPN
IND/UPN
UPN
WB
IND/UPN
FOX
UPN
FOX
IND
WB/UPN
IND
FOX
IND/UPN
UPN
IND/UPN
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End
Dec-97
Jul-98
Aug-96
Start
Dec-94
Jun-94
Jul-96
Jun-94
Jul-96
Aug-95
Jul-95
Aug-95
Jul-98
Jul-98
Jun-94
Aug-96
Aug-94
May-92
Mar-94
Apr-98
May-94
Jun-94
Jul-98
Sep-98
Aug-96
Aug-98
Apr-94
Sep-94
Jul-97
Jun-94
Nov-91
Jun-94
Jun-95
Mar-96
May-96
Nov-95
Jan-98Jul-93
Jan-98
Dec-94
May-93
Jul-98
Sep-95
Mar-96
Mar-96
Sep-96
Apr-98
Apr-94
Aug-92
Mar-94
Aug-93
Meridian
Milwaukee
Mobile-Pensacola
Mobile-Pensacola
Monterey-Salinas
Nashville
Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Paducah-Cape Girardeau-
Harrisburg-Mt Vernon
Palm Springs
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland-Auburn
Providence-New Bedford
Raleigh-Durham
Raleigh-Durham
Reno
Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto
San Antonio
Savannah
Seattle-Tacoma
Shreveport
Spokane
Syracuse
Tucson
Tulsa
Victoria
Waco-Temple-Bryan
West Palm Beach-Ft. Pierce
24 WMDN
24 WCGV
15 WPMI
3 WEAR
35 KCBA
17 WZTV
10 WAVY
34 KOCB
42 KPTM
23 KBSI
42 KESQ
3 KTVK
53 WPGH
51 WPXT
12 WPRI
22 WLFL
5 WRAL
11 KRXI
3 KCRA
29 KABB
22 WJCL
5 KING
33 KMSS
2 KREM
68 WSYT
11 KMSB
23 KOKI
25 KAVU
44 KWKT
25 WPBF
CBS
FOX/UPN
FOX/NBC
ABC
CBS
FOX
NBC
WB
FOX
FOX
ABC
IND
FOX
FOX
CBS
FOX/WB
CBS
FOX
NBC
FOX
ABC
NBC
FOX
CBS
FOX
FOX
FOX
ABC
FOX
ABC
30 WGBC
18 WVTV
44 WJTC
35 WFGX
46 KION
30 WUXP
43 WVBT
25 KOKH
15 KXVO
49 WDKA
40 KDFX-LP
61 KASW
22 WPTT
35 WPME
64 WNAC
28 WRDC
50 WRAZ
21 KAME
58 KQCA
35 KRRT
28 WTGS
16 KONG
45 KSHV
22 KSKN
43 WNYS
18 KTTU
41 KTFO
19 KVCT
62 KAKW
34 WTVX
NBC
IND/WB
IND/UPN
WB
FOX
UPN
WB/FOX
FOX
WB
UPN
FOX
WB
UPN/WB
UPN
FOX
UPN
WB/FOX
UPN
UPN/WB
UPN/WB
FOX
IND
UPN
UPN
UPN
IND/UPN
IND/UPN
FOX
UPN
UPN
Aug-95
Mar-93
Mar-93
Mar-96
Apr-96
Feb-96
Dec-94
Jul-98
Jun-95
Jun-97
Jul-98
Dec-94
Jan-92
Jan-96
Jul-96
Mar-95
Jun-94
Sep-95
Dec-94
Aug-95
Jul-96
May-96
Jan-96
Jul-96
Jul-96
Oct-91
Nov-93
Jan-95
Jan-96
Aug-95 Jul-97
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Table 2: Jointly Owned Full-Power and Low-Power Stations
DMA
Austin
Bakersfield
Casper-Riverton
Chico-Redding
Columbia-Jefferson City
Corpus Christi
Eugene
Fairbanks
Florence-Myrtle Beach
Ft. Smith
Grand Junction-Montrose
Lafayette LA
Lubbock
North Platte
Tri-Cities TN-VA
Tyler-Longview
Utica
Wichita Falls-Lawton
Full-Power Station
7 KTBC
45 KUVI
20 KFNB
30 KCVU
17 KMIZ
6 KRIS
34 KLSR
7 KFXF
43 WFXB
46 KPBI-LP
5 KREX
15 KADN
34 KJTV
2 KNOP
19 WKPT
51 KFXK
33 WFXV
18 KJTL
Affiliation
FOX
UPN
ABC
FOX
ABC
NBC
FOX
FOX
FOX
FOX
CBS
FOX
FOX
NBC
ABC
FOX
FOX
FOX
Low-Power Station
13 K13VC
39 KABE-LP
26 KWYF-LP
22 KRVU-LP
2 K02NQ
47 K47DF
25 KEVU-LP
13 K13XD
56 WEYB-LP
32 KFDF-LP
27 KGJT-LP
62 KLAF-LP
22 KUPT-LP
11 KlTW
30 WAPK-LP
22 KLPN-LP
11 WPNY-LP
35 KJBO-LP
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Start
Oct-97
Apr-97
Affiliation
IND/UPN
UNI
FOX
UPN
FOX
FOX
UPN
CBS
IND
UPN
FOX
UPN
UPN
UPN
UPN
UPN
UPN
UPN
Table 3: Market-level Variables
830 observations (166 markets, 5 years)
Variable Definition Mean Std dev
PRICE
MKTRATING
AH
A HBIG3BIG3
A HBIG3FOX
A HBIG31ND
A HFOXIND
A HINDIND
HBASE
MERGER
2NDMERGER
BIG3BIG3
BIG3FOX
BIG3IND
2NDBIG3IND
FOXIND
INDIND
2BIG3
3BIG3
FOX
1IND
2IND
3IND
CABLEPEN
METERED
INCOME
AGE1849
BLACK
Average cost of a 30-second prime-time
commercial, per thousand households reached
Average percentage of DMA households
watching local commercial broadcast stations
from 9 AM to midnight during November
Increase in Herfindahl due to merger
AH due to merger between affiliates of Big
Three networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC)
AH due to merger between Big Three affiliate
and Fox affiliate
AH due to merger between Big Three affiliate
and station unaffiliated with Big Three or Fox
AH due to merger between Fox affiliate and
station unaffiliated with Big Three or Fox
A H due to merger between stations unaffiliated
with Big Three or Fox
Herfindahl index for broadcast stations, assuming
all stations separately operated
Indicator for market with at least one merger
Indicator for market with two mergers
Big Three-Big Three merger indicator
Big Three-Fox merger indicator
Big Three-Independent merger indicator
Indicator for market with two Big Three-
Independent mergers
Fox-Independent merger indicator
Independent-Independent merger indicator
Indicator for market with 2 Big Three affiliates
Indicator for market with 3 Big Three affiliates
Indicator for market with Fox affiliate
Indicator for market with 1 Independent affiliate
Indicator for market with 2 Independent affiliates
Indicator for market with 3 Independent affiliates
Fraction of households subscribing to cable
Indicator for whether Nielsen uses set meters to
measure viewing of local stations
Average household income, in thousands
Fraction of population in 18-49 age group
Fraction of population that is black
18.2775 6.2040
23.2282
0.0068
0.0009
0.0024
0.0016
0.0017
0.0003
0.2830
0.2470
0.0181
0.0157
0.0530
0.0747
0.0060
0.0964
0.0193
0.0639
0.9060
0.8747
0.2241
0.1301
0.0470
0.6494
0.2108
38.9262
0.4643
0.1102
5.0522
0.0165
0.0085
0.0120
0.0066
0.0058
0.0023
0.0788
0.4315
0.1333
0.1242
0.2242
0.2631
0.0774
0.2953
0.1376
0.2446
0.2920
0.3313
0.4172
0.3366
0.2117
0.0781
0.4082
5.6120
0.0289
0.1133
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Sources: PRICE is from the Media Market Guide. MKTRATING is from Nielsen as
reported in the Investing in Television Market Report, published by BIA. The revenue
data used to construct the Herfindahl variables are from the Investing in Television
Market Report. CABLEPEN is from the Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook. METERED
is from Nielsen. INCOME, AGE1849, and BLACK are from the Survey of Buying Power
and Media Markets.
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Table 4: Price Regressions with Herfindahl-based Market Structure Measures
Dependent variable: In(PRICE)
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
AH 0.2858
(0.4189)
A HBIG3BIG3
A HBIG3FOX
A HBIG3IND
1.1730
(0.4340)
-0.4904
(0.4503)
1.1098
(0.9796)
0.9385
(1.0542)
5.2570
(2.6776)
A HFOXIND
A HINDIND
A HSAME
A HDIFF
HBASE
CABLEPEN
METERED
In(INCOME)
AGE1849
BLACK
0.1266
(0.2265)
1.3973
(0.3777)
0.0490
(0.0259)
0.3208
(0.2286)
-7.1546
(5.0486)
1.4297
(0.9853)
0.1423
(0.0334)
0.0893
(0.0462)
0.1316
(0.0410)
0.2063
(0.0783)
0.9304
830
1995
1996
1997
1998
R2
Num. obs.
1.5253
(0.4734)
-0.1317
(0.4343)
0.1022
(0.2262)
1.3168
(0.3831)
0.0493
(0.0254)
0.3666
(0.2308)
-7.4921
(5.0522)
1.3808
(0.9864)
0.1462
(0.0334)
0.0914
(0.0461)
0.1342
(0.0410)
0.2056
(0.0782)
0.9312
830
0.1936
(0.2409)
1.2748
(0.3860)
0.0420
(0.0234)
0.3413
(0.2324)
-7.4928
(5.0444)
1.6136
(1.0097)
0.1441
(0.0334)
0.0897
(0.0461)
0.1324
(0.0409)
0.2055
(0.0780)
0.9317
830
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Notes: All columns include market fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Price Regressions with Numbers-based Market Structure Measures
Dependent variable: In(PRICE)
Variable
MERGER
Column 
0.0057
(0.0175)
-0.0131
(0.0439)
2NDMERGER
BIG3BIG3
BIG3FOX
BIG3IND
2NDBIG3IND
FOXIND
INDIND
2BIG3
3BIG3
FOX
IIND
2IND
3IND
CABLEPEN
METERED
In(INCOME)
AGE1849
BLACK
1995
1996
1997
1998
CONSTANT
-0.0111
(0.0953)
-0.0966
(0.0404)
-0.0717
(0.0292)
0.0050
(0.0212)
0.0823
(0.0341)
0.0919
(0.0487)
1.1860
(0.3537)
0.0172
(0.0272)
0.2175
(0.2382)
-5.3620
(4.6026)
1.2288
(0.9547)
0.1523
(0.0302)
0.1108
(0.0400)
0.1556
(0.0343)
0.2492
(0.0676)
3.6416
(2.4461)
0.9335
830
g2
Nhlr- ,1-k
Column 2
0.1509
(0.0462)
0.0099
(0.0281)
0.0040
(0.0250)
-0.1002
(0.0335)
-0.0074
(0.0228)
0.0348
(0.0433)
0.0095
(0.0937)
-0.0978
(0.0415)
-0.0660
(0.0304)
0.0100
(0.0215)
0.1000
(0.0359)
0.1074
(0.0516)
1.0872
(0.3534)
0.0077
(0.0255)
0.2222
(0.2394)
-5.5297
(4.6092)
1.2115
(0.9594)
0.1540
(0.0302)
0.1115
(0.0401)
0.1581
(0.0344)
0.2498
(0.0679)
3.7584
(2.4458)
0.9346
830
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iU1il. ul b.
Notes: All columns include market fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6: Station-level Variables
Variable Definition Mean Std dev
STNRATING Average percentage of DMA households 5.0811 2.7134
watching station from 9 AM to midnight
during November
BROKERING Indicator for whether station is the brokering 0.0533 0.2246
station in an LMA
BROKERED Indicator for whether station is the brokered 0.0533 0.2246
station in an LMA
LMIACOMlP (see text) 0.0533 0.1264
JOINTFP Indicator for full-power station jointly owned 0.0114 0.1064
with another station in the same market
JOINTLP Indicator for low-power station jointly owned 0.0065 0.0802
with another station in the same market
FPLPCOMP (see text) 0.0090 0.0665
ABC ABC affiliate indicator 0.2133 0.4097
CBS CBS affiliate indicator 0.2120 0.4088
NBC NBC affiliate indicator 0.2113 0.4083
FOX Fox affiliate indicator 0.1839 0.3875
UPN UPN affiliate indicator 0.0637 0.2443
WB WB affiliate indicator 0.0411 0.1985
CABPEN Fraction of households subscribing to cable 0.6526 0.0801
CABPEN*UHF CABPEN interacted with UHF indicator 0.2900 0.3315
CABPEN*LP CABPEN interacted with low-power station 0.0145 0.0969
indicator
METERED Indicator for whether Nielsen uses set meters 0.2912 0.4544
to measure viewing of local stations
METERED*BIG3 METERED interacted with Big Three affiliate 0.1339 0.3406
indicator
INCOME Average household income. in thousands 39.8402 6.0185
NUMSTN Number of stations in DMA with positive 5.0528 1.6577
ratings in November
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Table 7: Market-level Ratings Regressions with Herfindahl-based Market Structure
Measures
Dependent variable: MKTRATING
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
AH 0.0414
(4.8798)
A HBIG3BIG3
A HBIG3FOX
A HBIG3IND
A HFOXIND
A HINDIND
12.7227
(7.9407)
-3.3092
(5.5720)
-12.4132
(13.6481)
-6.8365
(12.1019)
62.9563
(32.1639)
A HSAME
A HDIFF
HBASE
CABLEPEN
METERED
INCOME
1995
1996
1997
1998
-5.1309
(2.3146)
-8.5571
(3.8635)
5.4357
(0.5524)
-0.1074
(0.0524)
-2.6471
(0.2259)
-3.3070
(0.2061)
-4.2129
(0.2114)
-5.3243
(0.2336)
0.9654
830
.
2
Num. obs.
-5.4328
(2.5456)
-9.8172
(3.8966)
5.3865
(0.5349)
-0.0941
(0.0535)
-2.5766
(0.2298)
-3.2432
(0.2081)
-4.1492
(0.2136)
-5.2747
(0.2136)
0.9660
830
14.7795
(7.9761)
-4.9147
(4.9930)
-5.4090
(2.3859)
-9.6215
(3.9060)
5.4401
(0.5455)
-0.0977
(0.0529)
-2.5926
(0.2275)
-3.2524
(0.2074)
-4.1517
(0.2126)
-5.2672
(0.2351)
0.9658
830
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Notes: All columns include market fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8: Market-level Ratings Regressions with Numbers-based Market Structure
Measures
Dependent variable: MKTRATING
Variable
MERGER
2NDMERGER
BIG3BIG3
BIG3FOX
BIG3IND
2NDBIG31ND
FOXIND
INDIND
2BIG3
3BIG3
FOX
IIND
2IND
3IND
CABLEPEN
METERED
INCOME
1995
1996
1997
1998
CONSTANT
Column 1
-0.2199
(0.2029)
0.0555
(0.6781)
-2.4478
(0.9026)
0.1464
(0.6982)
1.3049
(0.2234)
0.1216
(0.2052)
0.5454
(0.4164)
1.4016
(0.8260)
-6.0755
(4.0622)
5.3645
(0.5751)
-0.0778
(0.0528)
-2.6738
(0.2321)
-3.4185
(0.2118)
-4.3959
(0.2126)
-5.5906
(0.2325)
31.0567
(2.8678)
0.9675
830
R 2
Num. obs.
Column 2
1.3420
(0.6326)
-0.0842
(0.2816)
-0.6831
(0.3213)
-0.0207
(0.8387)
-0.1397
(0.2885)
0.3859
(0.8584)
-2.1231
(0.8840)
0.2439
(0.7454)
1.3382
(0.2368)
0.1940
(0.2306)
0.6738
(0.4804)
1.6642
(0.8952)
-7.0100
(3.9930)
5.3323
(0.5765)
-0.0730
(0.0527)
-2.6345
(0.2304)
-3.3824
(0.2097)
-4.3517
(0.2107)
-5.5722
(0.2307)
31.26 12
(2.8441)
0.9681
830
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Notes: All columns include market fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 9: Station-Level Ratings Regression
Dependent variable: STNRATING
Variable Column 1
BROKERING 0.1073
(0.0810)
BROKERED 0.2475
(0.1223)
LMA COMP -0.1278
(0.2048)
JOINTFP 0. 1430
(0.1811)
JOINTLP 0.5317
(0.6012)
FPLPCOMP -0.3730
(0.3740)
ABC 1.8664
(0.2052)
CBS 2.4863
(0.2105)
NBC 2.7033
(0.2256)
FOX 1.0820
(0.1763)
UPN 0.6759
(0.0940)
WB 0.5587
(0.0952)
CABPEN -7.798 1
(1.2777)
CABPEN*UHF 19.8053
(1.2916)
CABPEN*LP 33.0589
(7.2303)
METERED 1.2064
(0.1007)
METERED *BIG3 -0.2955
(0.1340)
INCOME -0.0344
(0.0144)
1/NUMSTN 4.5458
(0.8316)
R 2 0.9607
Num. obs. 4018
Notes: Regression includes station and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Group Ownership on Television Station Ratings
1. Introduction
During the 1990s the broadcast television industry experienced significant
consolidation at the national level. While the number of significantly viewed stations
rose from 814 in 1993 to 921 in 1998, the number of firms controlling those stations
dropped from 331 to 219. As the number of stations per firm increased, so did the size of
the largest firms. In 1993 the largest firms owned ten stations that reached under 25
percent of U.S. television households. By 1998 some firms owned over thirty stations,
and others owned stations reaching 35 percent of U.S. television households.
One of the forces behind national consolidation in broadcast television was the
relaxation of the Federal Communications Commission's national television ownership
rule. Prior to 1996 the rule limited firms to owning no more than 12 stations, with the
additional restriction that no firm could own stations reaching more than 25 percent of
U.S. television households. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxed this rule by
eliminating the numerical limit and increasing the reach limit to 35 percent.
In this chapter I examine how the increase in group ownership during the 1990s
affected viewers by studying the effect of group ownership on the popularity of
programming that stations provide. There are two reasons why relaxing the restrictions
on group ownership may lead stations to provide more popular programming. The first is
that there may be economies of scale in program production and acquisition. In addition
to standard economies of scale, such as being able to spread fixed costs over a larger
number of stations and viewers, group ownership may also enhance bargaining power,
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allowing group owners to obtain better terms from program suppliers. For example, one
group owner states that "[a]s an owner or provider or programming services to 57 stations
in 36 DMAs reaching approximately 23.5% of U.S. television households ... , the
Company believes that it is able to negotiate favorable terms for the acquisition of
programming."' The second reason that relaxing group ownership restrictions may lead
to more popular programming is by allowing better-run stations groups to expand.
Station groups may differ in their ability to manage and program stations. The increase
in national consolidation during the 1990s may have reflected the expansion of these
better-run station groups, and hence resulted in better programming even in the absence
of any economies of scale.
I study the relationship between group ownership and program popularity
(measured by ratings) using data on 750 stations in 1993 and 1998. Controlling for
station fixed effects I find that group ownership results in higher ratings, although the
effect is small. My results indicate that a group-owned station's ratings are 4.8 percent
higher than a singly owned station. Stations that are owned by larger groups also have
higher ratings, although again the effect is small. Increasing a group's national reach by
ten percentage points increases ratings by only two percent.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of
the national television ownership rule and recent trends in group ownership. Section 3
Sinclair Broadcast Group, 1998 Form 10-K, p. 4. The only empirical study of this effect in the broadcast
industry (Federal Communications Commission 1980, vol. 2, pp. 641-650) finds that group owners actually
pay more per viewer-minute for syndicated programming. In the cable industry, Chipty (1995) finds that
larger cable operators charge lower prices, consistent larger operators having more bargaining power.
However, Chipty and Snyder (1999) find evidence suggesting that horizontal integration does not enhance
the bargaining position of cable operators against program suppliers.
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provides a brief review of the previous literature on the effects of group ownership.
Section 4 describes the data and section 5 presents the results, while section 6 concludes.
2. The National Television Ownership Rule and Group Ownership
The national television ownership rule has been in place since the beginning of
television. Initially the rule allowed one firm to own no more than five television
stations. In 1954 the FCC raised the limit to seven, provided that no more than five
stations were in the VHF band. In 1984 the FCC proposed eliminating the rule as of
1990, and raising the limit to twelve stations in the interim. After Congress threatened to
overturn this change, the FCC modified its proposals. The rule that went into effect in
1985 raised the limit to twelve stations but did not include the 1990 sunset provision.
Additionally, the rule included an audience reach cap of 25 percent: regardless of the
number of stations a firm owned, it was not allowed to own stations in markets that
contained more than 25 percent of national television households. For purposes of the
audience reach cap, a VHF station is counted as reaching all of the households in its
market, while a UHF station is counted as reaching 50 percent of the households in its
market.
The most recent change in the national ownership rule occurred in 1996. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated the numerical limit on the number of
stations, and increased the audience reach cap to 35 percent. The Telecommunications
Act also required the FCC to review its ownership rules biennially, and repeal or modify
any rule that is no longer in the public interest. In the first biennial review, begun in 1998
and completed in 2000, the FCC did not change the national ownership rule (Federal
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Communications Commission 2000). However, the new chair of the FCC has expressed
support for possible modification or repeal of the rule (Halonen 2001).
Tables I and 2 list the top 25 elevision groups in 1993 and 1998, as measured by
adjusted audience reach (details of the data used to construct these tables are discussed
below). In 1993, the national ownership rule was not a binding restriction on any group:
no group had an adjusted reach of 25 percent, and no group owned stations in 12 markets.
However, following the relaxation of the rule in 1996, several groups expanded their
holdings beyond the amount allowed previously. As Table 2 shows, by 1998 at least 14
groups owned more than 12 stations, and four groups had an adjusted reach of over 25
percent. The largest group owner, Fox, was at the adjusted reach limit of 35 percent.
In both 1993 and 1998 the four major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and
Fox) were among the top five group owners, which suggests that the networks prefer to
own the stations that distribute their programming. Ownership may be preferable to
contracting due to the standard problems of transactions costs and incomplete contracts.
In addition, the FCC restricts the type of contracts that networks and affiliates can write.
For example, network-affiliate contracts must give the station the right to reject network
programming.2 Since affiliation contracts are not a perfect substitute for ownership, the
programming decisions of network-owned stations may differ from those of affiliated
stations. Indeed, several studies have found that affiliated stations are more likely than
network-owned stations to preempt network programming (Federal Communications
Commission 1980, vol. 2, pp. 273-275, 282-286, Litman 1980, and Osborn, Driscoll, and
Johnson 1979).
2 See Besen and Soligo (1973) and Besen et. al. (1984. Chapters 4-6) for details of the FCC restrictions and
analyses of the network-affiliate relationship.
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3. Previous Literature
Besen and Johnson (1985), reviewing the existing literature on the effects of
group ownership, conclude that there is little evidence that group ownership has any
effect on competition, efficiency, or diversity.3 One paper that does find significant
effects of group ownership is Parkman (1982), which is the most direct predecessor of
this paper. Parkman studies the effect of ownership characteristics on local television
news ratings, and is interested in whether stations owned by groups, newspapers or radio
stations produce more popular news programs. His data consists of early- and late-news
ratings for stations in the top 100 markets in 1965 and 1975. Controlling for the number
and type (VHF vs. UHF) of stations in the market, Parkman finds that group ownership
does not have a statistically significant effect on news ratings in 1965. However, in 1975
group-owned stations have significantly higher ratings: group-owned stations have early-
news ratings that are 22 percent higher, and late-news ratings that are 20 percent higher.
Parkman suggests that the higher ratings may be the result of economies of scale in the
coverage of national news events that are of local interest.
In addition to studying a more recent time period, I differ from Parkman in two
other respects. First, since ownership has the potential to affect all of a station's
programming decisions, I use ratings for all types of programming rather than just local
news programs. Second, I use panel data to identify the effects of group ownership on
3 Studies of the effect of group or network ownership on advertising prices include Peterman (1971),
Wildman (1978), Levin (1980), and Fournier and Martin (1983). In the communications literature several
papers have studied the effect of group or network ownership on programming decisions and generally
found insignificant effects (Baldridge 1967, Prisuta 1977, Litman 1980. and Busterna 1988).
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ratings. Hence unlike Parkman, I control for unobserved factors that are correlated with
both group ownership and ratings.
4. Data
I collect data on ratings and group ownership for almost all commercial television
stations in the US in 1993 and 1998.4 The ratings variable, STNRATING, is the average
percentage of households in the DMA watching a given station from 9 AM to midnight
during the month of November.5
I construct several variables that measure the amount of group ownership.
GROUP is an indicator for firms that control stations in more than one market.
GROUPSTN is the number of markets in which a firm controls full-power stations.
REACH is the fraction of US television households in markets in which a firm controls
stations. ADJREACH is calculated in a similar manner, except that there is a 50 percent
discount for markets in which a firm controls only a UHF station, and markets in which a
firm controls only a low-power station do not count at all.
In order to separate the effects of national consolidation from the effects of local
consolidation, I construct these measures so that they are unaffected by control of a
second station in a given market. Hence if a firm that owns a full-power station in a
given market buys a low-power station in the same market, the group ownership variables
for that firm are unaffected.
I treat stations that are controlled by another station via a local marketing
agreement as being owned by the owner of the brokering station. For example, in the
4 The only excluded stations are those in Anniston and Tuscaloosa (which Nielsen consolidated into the
Birmingham DMA in 1998) and Juneau (which Nielsen did not measure until 1998).
5 See Chapter 1 for details on how Nielsen measures ratings.
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Tucson DMA, KMSB, owned by Belo, controls KTTU, owned by Clear Channel.
According to this rule, KTTU does not contribute to the group ownership variables for
Clear Channel, and according to the "no double-counting" rule of the previous paragraph
it does not contribute to the group ownership variables for Belo either. However,
brokered stations do contribute to ownership variables in the case of out-of-market
LMAs, where a firm controls a station in a market where it does not already own a station
(see Table 3 for a list of out-of-market LMAs). Although the FCC did not treat LMAs as
attributable ownership interests during the time period under study, my treatment of
LMAs is consistent with the rules the FCC adopted in 1999 for the calculation of national
audience reach (Federal Communications Commission 1999b).
In constructing the group ownership variables I consider only stations with
nonzero all-day ratings during the month of November. This differs from the FCC,
which counts all on-the-air stations when calculating reach. Since groups with positive
ratings stations generally do not own zero-ratings stations, this difference does not have a
substantive effect on the group ownership variables.
For each year, a group is counted as owning a station if it purchased that station
(or took control via an LMA) prior to the fourth quarter of the year. The date the
purchase closed was used if it was available, otherwise I used the date the FCC approved
the license transfer.
In order to determine whether network ownership affects ratings I use the variable
O&O. This variable is equal to one for stations owned and operated by the four major
networks, ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox.
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Each of the ownership variables has a corresponding variable that captures the
effect of that ownership characteristic on stations competing in the same market. For
station i in market M, these variables are defined as
jGr.j, VARJVARCOMP i=
= NUMSTNi-1
where NUMSTNi is the number of stations in market M and VAR is GROUP,
GROUPSTN, REACH, ADJREACH, and O&O.
In an attempt to identify the mechanism behind the relationship between group
size and ratings, I also differentiate between stations that do not change owners between
1993 and 1998 and those that do change owners. Recall that there are two possible
explanations for a positive relationship between group size and ratings. The first
explanation is programming economies of scale. The second is that better-run groups
expanded during this period. To see how ownership changes help differentiate between
these two explanations, consider the following example. Two stations A and B are both
singly owned in 1993. Between 1993 and 1998 the owner of station A purchases station
B. If there are programming economies of scale the ratings of both stations should
increase. However, if there are no programming economies of scale but station A's
owner is better at running television stations than station B's original owner, then station
B's ratings should increase, and station A's ratings should stay the same. Hence if
economies of scale are the mechanism behind the relationship between group size and
ratings, a change in group size should affect ratings regardless of whether a station
changes ownership. If there are no economies of scale, then there should not be a
relationship between group size and ratings for stations that do not change ownership. To
implement this test I interact the group ownership variables with the variables
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CHANGEOWN and SAMEOWN. CHANGEOWN is an indicator equal to one if the
station changes ownership or control between 1993 and 1998, and SAMEOWN is an
indicator for the remaining stations.
The control variables are all the station and market characteristics used in the
station-level ratings regression in Chapter 2. Data are collected for two years, 1993 and
1998. The sample consists of all stations with non-zero November ratings in DMAs
without significant spillover from adjacent markets. There are 750 stations that are in the
sample in both years. Summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis are in
Table 4.
The statistics in Table 4 illustrate the significant increase in group ownership
during this period. For the average station in the sample group size increased from 4.3 to
10.7 and reach increased from under four percent to over nine percent. Tables 5 and 6
further illustrate the changes in group ownership experienced by stations in the sample.
Table 5 cross-tabulates the group ownership variables in 1993 with the group ownership
variables in 1998 for the 368 stations that do not change owners (i.e., stations with
SAMEOWN = 1), while Table 6 presents the cross-tabs for the 382 stations that do change
owners. Increases in group ownership are generally more prevalent than decreases. A
comparison of Table 5 to Table 6 indicates that there is more variation within the sample
of stations that changed owners than within the sample of stations that did not change
owners.
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5. Results
I report results from two sets of fixed-effects regressions of ratings on station and
market characteristics. The first'set of regressions, reported in Table 7, focuses on
establishing the relationship between group ownership and ratings. The second page of
the table presents results for the variables used in Chapter 2. The addition of the group
ownership variables does not significantly change the results from Chapter 2, although
some of the coefficients are estimated less precisely given that the regressions in this
chapter do not use as many years of data.
The first page of Table 7 presents the results for the group ownership variables.
All columns include GROUP, the indicator for group-owned stations. The coefficient for
this variable is consistent across specifications, and indicates the group ownership
increases ratings by about 0.25 percentage points, or a 4.8 percent increase evaluated at
the average rating of 5.2 percent.
In the first three columns of Table 7 I explore whether, controlling for GROUP,
the degree of group ownership affects ratings. The number of stations controlled by a
group does not appear to affect ratings, as the coefficient on GROUPSTN is small and
statistically insignificant. Columns 2 and 3 contain the results for the specifications using
REACH and ADJREACH, which discounts UHF stations by 50 percent. Although the
coefficients on both of the reach measures are similar in magnitude, the coefficient on
REACH is estimated more precisely. Increased reach has only a small effect on ratings.
The results predict that a ten-percentage point increase in REACH increases ratings by
about 0.1 percentage points, or about two percent.
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The last two columns of Table 7 include the network ownership indicator O&O.
The estimated coefficient for this variable is small and statistically insignificant. Hence
although the programming decisions of network-owned stations and affiliated stations
may differ, there is no evidence that network ownership affects the popularity of a
station's programming.
The second set of regressions attempts to identify the mechanism behind the
(small) positive relationship between group size and ratings. If programming economies
of scale explain the relationship, then increases in a station's group size should increase
ratings regardless of whether that station changes owners. If there are no programming
economies of scale, then increases in group size for stations that do not change owners
should not increase ratings. I test these hypotheses by interacting the group ownership
variables with SAMEOWN and CHANGEOWN.
The results, reported in Table 8, are inconclusive. The coefficients on
GROUP*SAMEOWN and GROUP*CHANGEOWN indicate that group ownership
increases ratings only for stations that change owners. However, the results for the reach
variables indicate that increases in reach increase ratings only for stations that do not
change owners. It is unclear how to interpret these results. The fact that ratings increase
with reach for stations that do not change owners supports the hypothesis of
programming economies of scale, but if there are programming economies of scale then
ratings should also increase with reach for stations that do change owners.6 Hence using
these data it is difficult to draw conclusions about the mechanism behind the group size-
ratings relationship.
6 When the indicator variable CHANGEOWN*1998 is included in the regressions its coefficient is small
and insignificant, and the coefficients and standard errors of the other variables are relatively unaffected.
Hence negative effects of changing ownership do not appear to explain the result.
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6. Conclusion
This chapter has studied how the increase in group ownership during the 1990s
affected the popularity of programming provided by broadcast television stations. I find
that group-owned stations have slightly higher ratings than singly owned stations, and
that stations owned by larger groups have marginally higher ratings. Controlling for the
effects of group ownership, network ownership has no discernible influence on ratings.
If the increase in group ownership accompanying the 1996 relaxation of the
FCC's national ownership rule had harmed viewers then we would expect to see ratings
declines for stations whose degree of group ownership increased. Instead, the ratings for
stations with increased amounts of group ownership rose slightly during the period from
1993 to 1998. This chapter has not attempted a complete analysis of all the costs and
benefits associated with the national television ownership rule. However, it does suggest
that the increase in group ownership following the 1996 relaxation of the rule did not
harm viewers, but rather may have benefited them.
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Table 1: Top 25 Owners by Adjusted Reach, 1993
Owner
Capital Cities/ABC
CBS
General Electric (NBC)
Tribune
Fox
Chris-Craft
Gannett
Univision
Westinghouse
SCI Television
Scripps Howard
Telemundo
Cox
Hearst
Belo
Paramount
Great American
Disney
Providence Journal
Pulitzer
LIN
Post-Newsweek
Gaylord
Multimedia
-Meredith
Adjusted Reach
0.236
0.218
0.202
0.194
0.192
0.179
0.104
0.102
0.097
0.089
0.087
0.080
0.076
0.067
0.058
0.058
0.054
0.053
0.053
0.052
0.047
0.047
0.042
0.042
0.040
Unadjusted Reach
0.238
0.218
0.202
0.219
0.234
0.197
0.117
0.206
0.097
0.105
0.104
0.161
0.076
0.067
0.058
0.116
0.054
0.053
0.057
0.055
0.053
0.047
0.050
0.042
0.048
Notes: Chris-Craft includes BHC Communications and United Television. "Unadjusted
Reach" is fraction of U.S. television households in markets where group controls a
station with positive ratings. "Adjusted Reach" discounts markets where group controls
only a UHF station by 50 percent, and does not count markets where group controls only
a low-power station. "Stations" is number of markets where group controls a full-power
station.
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Stations
8
8
6
7
8
8
10
8
5
7
10
5
6
6
5
7
6
1
9
9
7
4
3
5
7
Table 2: Top 25 Owners by Adjusted Reach, 1998
Owner
Fox
Westinghouse (CBS)
Tribune
General Electric (NBC)
Disney (ABC)
Chris-Craft
Gannett
Belo
Univision
Sinclair
Viacom
Cox
Young
Paxson
Hearst-Argyle
Scripps Howard
Post-Newsweek
Meredith
Hicks, Muse
Raycom
Pulitzer
Media General
Telemundo
Granite
Allbritton
Adjusted Reach
0.351
0.309
0.270
0.266
0.239
0.182
0.163
0.138
0.135
0.134
0.130
0.096
0.091
0.088
0.084
0.081
0.072
0.063
0.061
0.053
0.053
0.046
0.045
0.042
0.041
Unadjusted Reach
0.406
0.318
0.375
0.279
0.242
0.206
0.167
0.143
0.274
0.223
0.245
0.098
0.092
0.177
0.097
0.099
0.072
0.078
0.068
0.061
0.055
0.055
0.089
0.071
0.053
Notes: Chris-Craft includes BHC Communications and United Television. Hicks, Muse
includes LIN Television and STC Broadcasting. See notes to Table I for definitions.
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Stations
22
15
19
13
10
9
19
17
13
35
18
9
13
9
13
9
6
10
15
21
9
14
4
10
8

--
Table 3: Out-of-Market Local Marketing Agreements, 1998
DMA
Binghamton
Boise
Bowling Green
Gainesville
Grand Rapids-Kalamazoo-Battle Creek
Lincoln-Hastings-Kearney
North Platte
Providence-New Bedford
Salt Lake City
Utica
Washington DC
West Palm Beach-Ft. Pierce
Youngstown
Yuma-El Centro
Station
34 WIVT
9 KNIN
20 WKNT
53 WGFL
8 WOOD
13 KHGI
6 KWNB
28 WLWC
30 KUWB
20 WUTR
50 WBDC
34 WTVX
27 WKBN
9 KECY
Controlling Firm
Ackerley
Lambert
Northwest
Pegasus
Hicks, Muse (LIN)
Pappas
Pappas
Viacom
Acme Television
Ackerley
Tribune
Viacom
Gocom
News-Press & Gazette
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Table 4: Variables
STNRATING
GROUP
GROUPSTN
REACH
ADJREA CH
GROUPCOMP
GROUPSTNCOMP
REA CHCOMP
ADJREA CHCOMP
O&O
O&OCOMP
GROUP *SAMEO WN
GROUP*CHANGEOWN
GRO UPSTN*SAMEO WN
GRO UPSTN*CHANGEO WN
REA CH*SAMEO WN
REA CH*CHANGEOWN
ADJREA CH *SAMEO WN
ADJREA CH*CHANGEOWN
GROUPSAMECOMP
GRO UPCHANGECOMP
GRO UPSTNSAMECOMP
GRO UPSTNCHANGECOMP
REA CHSAMECOMP
REA CHCHANGECOMP
ADJREA CHSAMECOMP
ADJREACHCHANGECOMP
BROKERING
BROKERED
LMA COMP
JOINTFP
JOINTLP
FPLPCOMP
ABC
CBS
NBC
FOX
UPN
WB
CABPEN
CABPEN* UHF
CABPEN*LP
1993
Mean
6.1961
0.8053
4.2933
0.0387
0.0319
0.7961
4.2453
0.0381
0.0313
0.0400
0.0379
0.4187
0.3867
2.1427
2.1507
0.0209
0.0178
0.0171
0.0149
0.4152
0.3809
2.1268
2.1185
0.0206
0.0174
0.0167
0.0146
0.0147
0.0147
0.0143
0.0053
0.0000
0.0027
0.2333
0.2307
0.2267
0.1720
0.0000
0.0000
0.6210
0.2603
0.0051
(750 stations)
Std dev
3.1377
0.3962
2.7566
0.0571
0.0501
0.2436
1.7023
0.0438
0.0369
0.1961
0.1129
0.4937
0.4873
2.8477
2.9527
0.0482
0.0410
0.0394
0.0382
0.2780
0.2836
1.6141
1.5645
0.0301
0.0221
0.0242
0.0198
0.1203
0.1203
0.0719
0.0729
0.0000
0.0447
0.4232
0.4215
0.4190
0.3776
0.0000
0.0000
0.0810
0.3135
0.0574
1998 (750
Mean
4.7744
0.9080
10.6920
0.0925
0.0730
0.8951
10.3167
0.0894
0.0690
0.0773
0.0677
0.4187
0.4893
3.4267
7.2653
0.0309
0.0616
0.0250
0.0480
0.4669
0.4282
3.9529
6.3638
0.0359
0.0535
0.0275
0.0416
0.0813
0.0480
0.0767
0.0133
0.0027
0.0144
0.2187
0.2253
0.2253
0.1853
0.0560
0.0453
0.6641
0.2783
0.0054
stations)
Std dev
2.1448
0.2892
8.8286
0.1126
0.0915
0.1823
5.2994
0.0772
0.0605
0.2673
0.1306
0.4937
0.5002
5.5056
9.8737
0.0738
0.1052
0.0600
0.0846
0.2596
0.2551
3.2256
5.1239
0.0456
0.0543
0.0356
0.0423
0.2735
0.2139
0.1448
0.1148
0.0516
0.0786
0.4136
0.4181
0.4181
0.3888
0.2301
0.2082
0.0813
0.3349
0.0605
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METERED 0.2400 0.4274 0.3467 0.4762
METERED *BIG3 0.1147 0.3188 0. 1733 0.3788
INCOME 39.6797 6.1817 41.8319 6.2598
NUMSTN 4.7360 1.5993 5.2453 1.7335
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Table 5: Changes in Group Ownership (SAMtEOWN = 1 Sample)
GROUP( 1998)
GROUP( 1993)
0
1
Total
GROUPSTN(1993)
<2
[3,4]
[5,6]
27
Total
REACH(1993)
<0.006
[0.006,0.017)
[0.017,0.04)
>0.04
Total
ADJREA CH( 1993)
<0.004
[0.004,0.013)
[0.013,0.03)
> 0.03
Total
0 I
44 10
10 304
54 314
Total
54
314
368
GROUPSTN( 1998)
<->Y 2 [3,4] [5,6] >7
107 2 2 0
6 49 22 17
3 4 9 58
0 0 0 89
116 55 33 164
<0.006
REACH(1998)
[0.006,0.017) [0.017,0.04)
Total
111
94
74
89
368
>0.04
86 3 1 0
7 61 23 5
2 6 55 27
0 0 1 91
95 70 80 123
ADJREACH(1998)
<0.003 [0.004,0.013) [0.013,0.03) >0.03
80 0 0 0
7 64 25 4
1 6 35 34
0 0 1 111
88 70 6 1 149
89
Total
90
96
90
92
368
Total
80
100
76
112
368
Table 6: Changes in Group Ownership (CHANGEOWN = 1 Sample)
GROUP( 1998)
GROUP( 1993)
0
1
Total
GROUPSTN(1993)
<2
[3,4]
[5,6]
27
Total
REACH( 1993)
<0.006
[0.006,0.017)
[0.017,0.04)
>0.04
Total
ADJREACH( 1993)
<0.004
[0.004,0.013)
[0.013,0.03)
>0.03
Total
0 1
3 89
12 278
15 367
<2
GROUPSTN( 1998)
[3,4] [5,6]
Total
92
290
382
>7
19 7 29 94
7 1 3 51
5 7 8 56
2 0 2 91
33 15 42 292
<0.006
REACH(1998)
[0.006,0.017) [0.017,0.04)
Total
149
62
76
95
382
>0.04
22 42 15 25
5 9 20 47
6 9 18 64
0 1 1  98
33 61 54 234
ADJREACH( 1998)
<0.003 [0.004,0.013) [0.013,0.03) 20.03
19 44 11 28
6 13 14 53
5 7 18 78
0 2 0 84
30 66 43 243
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Total
104
81
97
100
382
Total
102
86
108
86
382
Table 7: Station-level Ratings Regressions
Dependent variable: STNRATING
Variable Column 1
GROUP
GRO UPSTN
REACH
0.2585
(0.1194)
-0.0009
(0.0053)
Column 2
0.2513
(0.1185)
0.9824
(0.5125)
ADJREACH
GROUPCOMP
GROUPSTNCOMP
-0.6140
(0.2115)
0.0253
(0.0098)
REACHCOMP
-0.5270
(0.2064)
3.2678
(0.9157)
ADJREACHCOMP
O&O
O&OCOMP
R2 0.9591 0.9597 0.9598 0.9598 0.9598
Num. obs. 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
Notes: Regressions include control variables (see next page) and station and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Column 3
0.2621
(0.1183)
1.0168
(0.6594)
-0.5187
(0.2065)
Column 4
0.2474
(0.1184)
1.2183
(0.5706)
-0.5232
(0.2076)
Column 5
0.2578
(0.1186)
1.3446
(0.8121)
-0.5183
(0.2075)
3.0422
(1.0937)
4.7204
(1.1879)
-0.1653
(0.2463)
0.2471
(0.5652)
4.8959
(1.5477)
-0.1786
(0.2691)
-0.1343
(0.6184)
Table 7 (continued)
Variable
BROKERING
BROKERED
LMA COMP
JOINTFP
JOINTLP
FPLPCOMP
ABC
CBS
NBC
FOX
UPN
WB
CABPEN
CABPEN*UHF
CABPEN*LP
METERED
METERED *BIG3
INCOME
1/NUMSTN
1998
CONSTANT
Column 1
0.1075
(0.1618)
0.4433
(0.2385)
-0.2067
(0.3438)
0.1489
(0.4848)
1.4079
(1.2846)
-0.2334
(0.8151)
1.7278
(0.3155)
2.5923
(0.3226)
2.4957
(0.3381)
1.3261
(0.2723)
0.9549
(0.1559)
0.8031
(0.1887)
-7.7573
(1.7941)
20.9190
(1.8043)
45.4931
(10.3942)
1.0150
(0.1922)
-0.2143
(0.2177)
-0.0323
(0.0235)
5.1437
(1.5409)
-1.5783
(0.1256)
3.5648
(1.2982)
Column 2
0.0545
(0.1665)
0.4042
(0.2321)
-0.2844
(0.3396)
0.1709
(0.5035)
1.4692
(1.1834)
-0.1886
(0.7925)
1.6547
(0.3233)
2.5352
(0.3298)
2.4423
(0.3429)
1.2366
(0.2826)
0.8488
(0.1637)
0.6276
(0.1883)
-8.1908
(1.7970)
20.7967
(1.7737)
44.3459
(9.5343)
0.8960
(0.1981)
-0.1816
(0.2262)
-0.0344
(0.0234)
4.9731
(1.5343)
-1.6035
(0.1217)
3.9609
(1.2841)
Column 3
0.0622
(0.1657)
0.4164
(0.2336)
-0.2601
(0.3374)
0.1827
(0.5019)
1.5375
(1.2194)
-0.1713
(0.7893)
1.6736
(0.3177)
2.5556
(0.3240)
2.4592
(0.3395)
1.2656
(0.2772)
0.8549
(0.1625)
0.6477
(0.1862)
-8.1074
(1.7815)
20.9734
(1.7683)
43.6745
(9.2665)
0.9172
(0.1960)
-0.2005
(0.2243)
-0.0353
(0.0233)
4.8789
(1.5376)
-1.6167
(0.1226)
3.8699
(1.2721)
Column 4 Column 5
0.0499
(0.1671)
0.3954
(0.2353)
-0.2730
(0.3437)
0.1627
(0.5032)
1.4696
(1. 1901)
-0.1883
(0.7913)
1.6541
(0.3219)
2.5342
(0.3283)
2.4348
(0.3417)
1.2632
(0.2834)
0.8313
(0.1669)
0.5870
(0.1977)
-8.0797
(1.8232)
20.6063
(1.8190)
43.8944
(9.6069)
0.9022
(0.2061)
-0.1984
(0.2299)
-0.0340
(0.0234)
4.9492
(1.5332)
-1.6057
(0.1217)
3.9274
(1.2865)
0.0569
(0.1665)
0.3989
(0.2377)
-0.2705
(0.3409)
0.1812
(0.5032)
1.5378
(1.2260)
-0.1638
(0.7889)
1.6719
(0.3169)
2.5506
(0.3234)
2.4484
(0.3384)
1.2811
(0.2787)
0.8431
(0.1649)
0.6198
(0.1939)
-8.0997
(1.8119)
20.8998
(1.8130)
43.5072
(9.5126)
0.9372
(0.2046)
-0.2100
(0.2276)
-0.0349
(0.0234)
4.8497
(1.5416)
-1.6248
(0.1231)
3.8701
(1.2784)
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Table 8: Station-level Ratings Regressions
Dependent variable: STNRATING
Variable Column 1
GROUP *SAMEOWN
GROUP *CHANGEOWN
GR O UPSTN *SAMEO WN
GR0 UPSTN *CHANGEOWN
REACH *SAMEOWN
REACH*CHANGEOWN
-0.2980
(0.2786)
0.4128
(0. 1301)
0.0215
(0.0134)
-0.0044
(0.0054)
ADJREA CH *SAMEO WN
ADJREA CH*CHANGEOWN
GR OUPSAMECOMP
GRO UPCHANGECOMP
GRO UPSTNSAMECOMP
GRO UPSTNCHANGECOMP
-0.3087
(0.3803)
-0.7317
(0.2412)
0.0190
(0.0183)
0.0272
(0.0108)
REA CHSAMECOMP
REACHCHANGECOMP
ADJREA CHSAMECOMP
ADJREA CHCHANGECOMP
O&O
O&OCOMP
R2 0.9597 0.9606 0.9606 0.9607 0.9606
Num. obs. 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
Notes: Regressions include control variables
standard errors in parentheses.
and station and year fixed effects. Robust
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Column 2
-0.2733
(0.2718)
0.4074
(0.1296)
Column 3
-0.2487
(0.2694)
0.4072
(0.1294)
Column 4
-0.2754
(0.2719)
0.4024
(0.1294)
Column 5
-0.2505
(0.2697)
0.4017
(0.1294)
4.8506
(1.2097)
0.4986
(0.5315)
5.1732
(1.2757)
0.7812
(0.5700)
5.2565
(1.4470)
0.3939
(0.6921)
-0.2376
(0.3704)
-0.6118
(0.2354)
-0.2489
(0.3737)
-0.6149
(0.2362)
5.6509
(1.5523)
0.7621
(0.7948)
-0.2337
(0.3720)
-0.6119
(0.2360)
-0.2408
(0.3753)
-0.6124
(0.2370)
2.9684
(2.0867)
3.2519
(1.0195)
2.7919
(2.1520)
3.0083
(1.1818)
4.0009
(2.7594)
4.7552
(1.2959)
4.2037
(2.9568)
4.8630
(1.6229)
-0.2000
(0.2623)
-0.1023
(0.6050)
-0.2037
(0.2451)
0.2509
(0.5487)
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